DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

DTIC Acquiring Information – Imparting Knowledge

Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145

CLIC PAPERS

A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE AD-A193 703

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS NA
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY NA	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT The paper has been reviewed by security and policy authorities and is cleared for public release.
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE NA	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) NA	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) A-AF CLIC
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)
A Framework for Competitive Strategies Development in Low Intensity Conflict (Unclassified)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Howard L. Dixon, Col, USAF

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Final	FROM _____ TO NA	1988, April	

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
NA

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
			Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Competitive Strategy; Insurgency; Counterinsurgency

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

This paper offers a process by which strategists might consider how to develop specific competitive strategy options in LIC. Through the use of module analysis and flow presentation, the reader is offered a framework for conceptualizing and creating potential options for implementation. It is not meant to be a "cookbook approach" to the vast area which might exist through this endeavor, but rather a construct designed to provoke thought.

END

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☒ DTIC USERS	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Ronald L. Zelms, Maj. USAF	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (804) 764-2630 / 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL A-AF CLIC

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

by

HOWARD LEE DIXON
COLONEL, USAF

Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665-5556

APRIL 1988

DISCLAIMER

This paper represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, the Department of the Army, or the Department of the Air Force. The paper has been cleared for public release by security and policy review authorities.

THE ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

The mission of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) is to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in low intensity conflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army and Air Force of the role of the military instrument of national power in low intensity conflict, including the capabilities needed to realize that role, and provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.

CLIC PAPERS

CLIC PAPERS are informal, occasional publications sponsored by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. They are dedicated to the advancement of the art and science of the application of the military instrument of national power in the low intensity conflict environment. All military members and civilian Defense Department employees are invited to contribute original, unclassified manuscripts for publication as CLIC PAPERS. Topics can include any aspect of military involvement in low intensity conflict to include history, doctrine, strategy, or operations. Papers should be as brief and concise as possible. Interested authors should submit double-spaced typed manuscripts along with a brief, one-page abstract to Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556.

PREVIOUS CLIC PAPERS

Previous CLIC PAPERS are available in many major military libraries. Copies can be obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22305-6145, telephone (202) 274-6847 or AUTOVON 284-6847. These papers together with their DTIC reference number are listed below.

DTIC AD#	SHORT TITLE
A185 972	Operational Considerations in LIC
A185 973	Logistical Considerations in LIC
A185 974	Security Assistance and LIC: A Challenge to Excellence
A185 975	The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC
A185 976	Compilation of LIC References and Bibliography, Vol I
A185 977	Army Medical Department Roles and Functions in LIC
A185 978	Operational Art in LIC
A186 280	LIC Imperatives for Success
Pending	Modern Terrorism: Potential for Increased Lethality
Pending	Aid to Democratic States Facing Revolutionary Warfare
Pending	Technology Guidelines and Military Applications in LIC
Pending	Logistic Support for LIC An Air Force Perspective

PREFACE

Substantial work and thought has been conducted elsewhere on competitive strategies at the mid-to-high intensity global conventional level. As determined by those efforts, it is relatively easy to apply the concept of competitive strategies to new and emerging technologies. A greater payoff occurs, however, in developing operational concepts which employ either existing or innovative thought, not only to weapons development, but also to operational planning and military doctrine.

To successfully apply competitive strategies to low intensity conflict requires not only "stepping out" into additional areas beyond technology as noted above, but also institutionalization of the process beyond the Department of Defense. The concept must permeate the thought process and perceptions of virtually all government agencies and institutions concerned with national foreign policy formulation.

This paper offers a process by which strategists within all of these organizations might consider how to develop specific competitive strategy options in LIC. Through the use of module analysis and flow presentation, the reader is offered a framework for conceptualizing and creating potential options for implementation. It is not meant to be a "cookbook approach" to the vast area which might exist through this endeavor, but rather a construct designed to provoke thought.

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Lt Col Kenneth Brothers and Major Alexander Angelle for their contribution to portions of this paper. Additionally, editing support by LTC Michael Turner and Lt Col William Furr were crucial to the finished product.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Executive Summary

This study describes a process by which strategists can develop specific competitive strategy options in low intensity conflict. Through the use of module analysis and flow presentation, the reader is provided a framework for conceptualizing and creating potential options for implementation. (Figure 1, page 2)

Constraints on the development process are considered in several ways. This includes not only traditional strategic constraints but also consideration of how alternative future worlds might challenge the nation and what general strategy the governing body and populous might adopt to meet those challenges.

National security objectives are considered not as stand-alone objectives, but rather in the context of how the military components of national power can support other components such as the political, economic, and informational aspects. In translating those objectives into specific competitive strategy options, strategists must develop a balanced perception of friends and allies, divergent interests, and the threat relative to the global environment. To assist in this regard, the use of an ethnocentric filter is suggested.

To assist in developing specific competitive strategy options, the strategist uses a series of analysis modules as they relate to three concepts to either deter and/or compel entities:

1. Helping friends and allies to help themselves and thereby deter existing or potential threats to those nations' stability.

2. Persuading nations with interests divergent from those of the US to pursue courses of action which are complementary to those of the US.

3. Compelling those nations whose actions threaten the US and its friends and allies to adopt a course of action more favorable to the US.

Thus the strategist develops a number of specific competitive strategy options along three avenues of analysis. Comparative assessment analysis is conducted by focusing on friends and allies to ascertain their condition prior to development of a comprehensive and integrated nation building

program. Persuasive profile analyses is used to determine how best to reconcile the interests of other nations with the US. Finally, coercibility analysis is employed to determine how best to compel the threat to recede or pay more to maintain position.

Specific strategy options are developed within the context of future worlds and accompanying strategic constraints, as well as the LIC imperatives of political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and patience. Additional "limiters" during selection and implementation include an assessment of the potential for congressional and public support, technological feasibility, and, finally, the availability of resources.

To prevent the development of open-ended strategies which assume a life and bureaucratic structure of their own, series of measures of merit (MOM) are considered. The capability to develop effective MOMs may not always be possible. Yet, consideration of the thought process may, at a minimum, offer additional insight into specific competitive strategies and has the potential of avoiding the pursuit of strategies which have limited utility or are at cross purposes to other approaches.

An in-depth discussion of the framework development process is provided by the paper. Through a series of modules organized into sections, the reader is led from an overview of the general strategy planning process to practical examination of potential options.

Section I. This introductory section outlines the overall thrust of the study -- to develop a mechanism to analyze alternative strategies and policies in LIC.

Section II. This portion of the study provides a review of the terms and concepts applicable to strategy development and analysis at all levels of conflict. It covers fundamental topics such as national purposes, national interests, and national policy. One module outlines several potential national outlooks or selected general strategies that a nation might adopt. Understanding the direction the national outlook is moving and its relationship to the national purpose can assist strategists in determining realistic national security objectives.

Section III. This portion examines how the perceptions and analyses of the previous sections come together to formulate "National Security Objectives." It looks at tools available to achieve those objectives. These are the traditional components of national power: political, economic, informational, and military. For ease of analysis the study describes 13 components of power believed relevant to developing competitive strategies in LIC. Before attempting to develop specific strategy options, the strategist should filter his thinking by performing an ethnocentric analysis. Our own societal and cultural norms affect how we look at the world. A strategic perception that the

US is the center of the universe can unduly skew our expectations of how the other nations will react to specific strategies we implement.

Section IV. The modules in this portion of the study examine how a nation reacts on the international scene while trying to achieve its own purposes through its national outlook. The international scene can be viewed from three basic nation-state contexts: those friends and allies with interests and purposes closely aligned with our own, those with divergent interests and purposes but not considered threatening, and those with interests and purposes opposed or threatening to US purposes and interests. The US can seek to deter or influence nations from taking specific courses of action, or the US can seek to compel or force nations to change their course of action. The types of actions the US can take to bring about deterrence and/or compellence can be classed as either direct or indirect methods.

When dealing with our friends and allies, a comparative assessment analysis should be done. This analysis looks at the desired end-state our allies wish to achieve and how the US can best support their efforts. When dealing with those nations with divergent interests, a persuasive profile analysis is performed. Here the analyst tries to determine long-term strategies which will subtly change these countries toward interests more closely aligned with our own. Persuasion is used in an attempt to change the "market share" the US can measurably influence. When dealing with those nations threatening to US interests, two forms of analysis are performed: coercibility and conflict weariness. Out of these analyses, key leverage points or vulnerabilities should be evident. By taking advantage of such "windows of opportunity," the strategist can develop "accelerators" to increase US leverage against those nations. As the leverage increases, the threatening nation's interests and purposes should begin to change and become more acceptable to the US.

Section V. This section outlines the criteria for developing specific strategy options. A series of conditions, which the options should satisfy, are listed. The context in which these options are developed should consider alternative future worlds. Eight future worlds, ranging from more belligerent and chaotic to more benign or familial are discussed. Strategic constraints closely aligned to the environment of these eight alternative future worlds are covered. Finally, option development is discussed within the context of five LIC imperatives. As a specific option is being formulated, LIC imperatives must be considered: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and patience.

Section VI. The final section discusses the process of selecting, implementing, and measuring the success of particular competitive strategies after implementation. Here the importance of congressional and public support for a strategy is discussed. Additionally, a determination of technological feasibility and resource availability is also covered. Measures of merit represent attempts at quantifying and providing realistic, intermediate measures of progress or failures regarding particular programs. While developing MOMs, the analyst will also perform a preliminary cost/benefit analysis to determine the resource allocation needed for this strategy option. Once a specific strategy option is selected and implemented a feedback analysis begins. It uses indicators and MOMs to determine if the strategy is working as expected. Those rated positive are reviewed for possible adjustments to "accelerate" their effectiveness. Those rated negative are given substantive review for fundamental changes to make them "positive" or are abandoned, as appropriate.

No attempt has been made to exact a thorough comparison of all facets of the strategy development process. Competitive strategy development is founded on a substantial number of uncertainties. Regardless, planning cannot be abandoned because of uncertainty. Decisions which have long-term effects cannot be avoided because of imperfect knowledge about the future. Rather, the purpose of this study is to provide a framework within which the strategist can focus, test, and evaluate planning efforts and give decision-makers an opportunity to weigh the effects of decisions in a variety of settings. In conclusion, the strategy development process is an iterative process and options developed through this and other frameworks must be expanded, refined, and reworked to meet the needs of the particular situation.

A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

SECTION I -- INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to develop a framework for competitive strategies analysis in low intensity conflict (LIC). Some of the unique dimensions of LIC require strategists to conceptualize potential solutions to the LIC challenges ahead in a somewhat different manner. One example is the extension of planning periods often associated with LIC. Strategists are concerned with the future. However, strategists who focus on LIC may find themselves seeking changes which can only occur over multiple decades rather than years as with higher levels of conflict.

To address this extended planning cycle and assist future planners with competitive strategies in LIC, the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict undertook to develop a methodology or process to assist them to develop, analyze, and describe national security policies and strategies for any given future international environment or "world." Even though the methodology developed will be usable for any "world" at any level of conflict, the Center's task was limited to the development of alternative policies and competitive strategies in LIC. The policies and strategies sought were those focused against identifiable vulnerabilities or key leverage points of principal adversaries active in the LIC arena. Additionally, the study attempts to develop a mechanism for the development of policies and strategies capable of successfully persuading friends, allies, and uncommitted nations that their long-term interests would be better served through a course of action more closely aligned with the interests of the US.

This study draws extensively from previous US Army and US Air Force task forces concerned with the future; specifically, the Army 2000 Task Force and the Air Force New Horizons II study conducted in 1975. Substantial portions of this study were taken from Volume II (Alternative Strategies), Annex B (Methodology) of the New Horizons II study. Credit for creation of the overall strategy development process, alternative future worlds, and potential general strategies is directed to that study group.[1] Therefore, the New Horizons II effort has been adapted and enhanced for applicability to LIC for use in this study. For ease of reading, quotations and footnotes attributable to the New Horizons II study are not used. The competitive strategy analysis baseline model at Figure 1 is the compilation of portions of those and other studies as noted during the process development. To assist the reader in following the logic train throughout the process development, it is presented in sections consisting of a series of modules or sub-modules.


FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES DEVELOPMENT IN LIC
NATIONAL PURPOSE
CURRENT NATIONAL OUTLOOK (S)
NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES
CONTEXTS
• POLITICAL
• ECONOMIC
• INFORMATIONAL
• MILITARY
DETER AND/OR COMPEL
ENTITY
ANALYSES
FRIENDS/ALLIES
COMPARATIVE
DIVERGENT INTERESTS
PERSUASIVE PROFILE
THREAT
COERCIBILITY
DEVELOP SPECIFIC STRATEGY OPTIONS
CONTEXTS
• ALTERNATE FUTURE WORLD
• LIC IMPERATIVES
• STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS
SELECT AND IMPLEMENT STRATEGY
CONTEXTS
• CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT
• TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY
• RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
DEVELOP MEASURES OF MERIT AND FEEDBACK
NEGATIVE / POSITIVE
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY VALID

FIGURE 1

SECTION II -- FOUNDATIONS FOR STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Any attempt to articulate strategies, strategic concepts, or strategic processes, be they past, present, or future, should begin with a definition or description of the terms and concepts being used and an explanation of the interrelationships of these terms and concepts. While many readers may find a review of these terms and concepts somewhat esoteric, they are relevant to any strategy review process. In LIC, they are especially relevant as the distinction between war and peace is often unclear. Subtle shifts in US public and congressional opinion can have a substantial influence on the outcome of a particular conflict.

Unfortunately, many of these terms have been used and misused over time to the point that one term, e.g., national policy, may have acquired broad and contradictory meanings from the various writers and speakers using the term. The purpose of this section is, first, to review some of the terms traditionally used in explaining strategic concepts and to highlight the meaning of these terms and, second, to state and define the terms and concepts used in the methodology or process model developed for this study. Once this foundation has been laid, the more difficult task of explaining the dynamics and interactions of the process model and its outputs -- the alternative LIC competitive strategies -- can be undertaken.

Traditional Concepts and Definitions

Any analysis of strategy or strategic concepts usually begins with a hierarchical diagram which indicates the sources and purposes of strategy and the general relationship of strategy to the nation-state and to the instruments of power which are used to effect or implement the strategy. In Figure 2, the relationship is hierarchical with the national purposes being the most fundamental, most permanent, most general, most interpretative, and least definitive. By contrast, national strategy is least fundamental, least permanent, least general, least interpretative, and most definitive. Of course, each of these descriptions is relative. It would be very difficult to convince lower echelon planners in the military services or diplomatic corps that a national strategy is not interpretative or well defined. The point is, however, national strategy is less interpretative and better defined than national purpose or national interests. Another characteristic of the hierarchy is the degree of importance to the nation each concept represents. National purpose and national interest represent the most important features of the nation-state, while national policy and national strategy represent less important aspects.



FIGURE 2

Given this hierarchical structure, the concepts can now be defined and described. At the outset, the reader should be properly warned to be aware of the contradictions and confusion in the terms used and the concepts described. The effort here will be to focus on the meaning of the concepts and not on the various labels attached to them. The first of the concepts is national purpose. National purpose is the broad reason for the existence of the nation-state. It is the statement of values in which the people of a nation believe and for which the political system is designed to pursue. This national purpose may be written into a document. It may be embodied in the life or memory of a national hero. It may be found in the slogans or cries of a past revolution, or it may exist in the minds of people sharing common political culture. The national purpose of the United States is found partially in each of these sources but is perhaps best stated in these few words from the Preamble to the Constitution:

> . . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .

This statement reflects many of the fundamental American values and beliefs, and it gives a broad insight into what the American people expect from their political system. These values and beliefs are very general. They have changed little over time. They have been pursued by successive generations of Americans.

The concept of national interests is the second level of the hierarchy. Generally, national interests can be viewed as those values and concerns a nation views as indispensable to its survival and sovereignty, as well as to its continued development. For these interests, the nation would, if necessary, go to war to defend.

The concerns and considerations, stated in part by other writers, were consolidated into the following list. This list encompasses the range and scope of the national interests, which vary in importance and value to the individual nation-state:

* Preserve Sovereignty
* Maintain Territorial Integrity
* Maintain Physical Security
* Maintain Economic Security
* Provide Institutional Security
* Maintain International Access
* Preserve National Honor
* Maintain Status and Prestige
* Secure and Maintain World Peace

The basics of national interests do not really change. What changes is the interpretation of these basics. These interpretations of the national interest are usually stated by political leaders in fairly simple formats like the following:

* It is in the national interest of the United States to (whatever action) . . . .

* It is not in the national interest of the United States to (whatever action) . . . .

For example, the January 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States represents the current administration's perspective on US interests and how our security objectives support those interests. However, simple statements such as, "the survival of the US as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions intact," or "a healthy and growing US economy,"[2] ignore the complexities involved in determining what is in the national interest. Historically, the interpretations of the national interest may seem inconsistent and, in some cases, contradictory. For example, at one time it was not in the national interest of the United States to trade with the Soviet Union; however, less than a decade later it was. Now such trade continues and is actively sought in the area of agricultural products. These different interpretations are not necessarily inconsistent or contradictory. If one accepts the definition of national interests, he should also accept the variables of that definition: time, environment, and political leadership. Changes of sufficient magnitude in any or all of these variables can alter what is or is not in the national interest. Changes in the interpretation of the national interests will produce changes in national objectives, policies, and strategies.

National security objectives are the third concept of the hierarchy. They have been variously described as aims, goals, policy goals, and fundamental policies. National security objectives are the fundamental aims or goals of a nation-state

derived from the interpretation of the national interest. They are articulated by national political leaders and are supported by the commitment of national effort and resources. Stated national security objectives serve as the primary source of direction and guidance for the nation and national planners.

To be able to relate national security objectives to the means available to implement them, national policies are developed and articulated. National policies are defined as broad courses of actions or statements of guidance adopted at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. They link national objectives with the various tools or instruments -- political, economic, informational, and military -- available to achieve the objectives.

National security strategy is the lowest level in this traditional hierarchy of strategic concepts. It is also the concept that evokes the widest range of specificity from the various writers. The concepts vary from a very narrow concept of strategy which describes only the role of military force to the much broader definitions which envision a very high-level integration of political, economic, psychological, and military roles into a national effort. The common denominator for these concepts is the recognition that national security strategy, or even military strategy, is fundamentally designed to support national security objectives. Whether strategy is defined in broad or narrow terms, or whether it is defined as a plan or method of thought, strategy is unconditionally linked to the pursuit of national objectives through the use of one or more of the components of national power.

This link between the goals, as stated in the national security objectives, and their pursuit or achievement is the national security strategy. Because of broad and varied definitions of the term "strategy," it is important in this study to explain specifically what is meant when the term is used. In this study national security strategy is defined as the sum of the individual actions and programs which are selected to accomplish the national security objectives. These actions may encompass the use of any or all facets of national power -- political, economic, military, technological, and psychological during peace and war.

The US national security strategy, therefore, is the overall plan of action which the US political leadership has adopted to achieve the national security objectives and ultimately to fulfill the national purposes. However, one key factor must be included at this point. The selection of the various actions and programs which constitute the national security strategy will reflect the international and national environment in which they exist. This is a particularly critical factor when one begins to postulate future national security strategies.

Strategy Development Process

With the hierarchy of terms and concepts used in this study, the next task is to describe the process for developing alternative LIC-oriented national security strategies. The New Horizons II effort attempted to incorporate many of the dynamics of the international environment into the strategy development process. The major premise of that study was the international environment is the critical variable in strategy development and must be considered, implicitly or explicitly. This premise is absolutely critical to the LIC competitive strategies development process, which must be considered not only in the international environment but also with the inclusion of the ethnocentric filter. In addition, the hierarchy of terms and concepts has been sequenced in the strategy development process to reflect each one in a rational decision-making order. This strategy development process contains several additional concepts, in addition to those already mentioned, which need to be explained. These include the concepts of current national outlook and alternative future world contexts which will be discussed as we proceed.

Current National Outlook(s)

The concept of a national outlook is derived from a selected general strategy. General strategy is not original to this study and has appeared in the ideas of other writers over a period of time. However, the explicit articulation of the general strategy concept and the incorporation of that concept into the strategy development process as a national outlook is unique. In this study, a general strategy is a set of broad outlooks or behavior patterns a nation adopts in a given set of national and international environments. Seen as a finite number of alternatives, the general strategies cannot be viewed as truly independent input in the strategy development process in the same sense as the alternative future world contexts, national purposes, or components of power. These broad outlooks or behavior patterns, in turn, provide an overall framework or set of parameters in which the more specific national decisions can be made. Stated somewhat differently, the general strategy defines the matrix in which the more specific decisions will fit. An analysis of the factors that determine this general strategy framework reveals there are four sets of dichotomous variables which are the most significant. The broad outlook or behavior pattern of a nation-state in international affairs can be described as:

*	Projective	or	Introversive
*	Collectivist	or	Individualist
*	Stimulative	or	Reactive
*	Decisive	or	Accommodative

The combination of four of these variables, one from each set, will give a general outlook or general behavior pattern, i.e., general strategy, of a nation-state in international affairs. Before analyzing the various possible general strategies, a brief description of each of these sets of variables is necessary. The emphasis in this description is on the international aspects of these variables as they apply to nation-states.

Projective vs Introversive: A nation-state that is projective in international affairs is one outwardly involved with other nations and with international problems. A projective nation will seek out relationships -- political, economic, military, and sociocultural -- with other nations in order to exercise its power and to achieve its own national objectives. An introversive nation will tend to focus its attention and concern on its own domestic affairs. Such a nation does not seek nor does it want international involvement.

Collectivist vs Individualist: A collectivist nation tends to seek alliances and partnerships in its international affairs. Emphasis is also placed on collective defense pacts and other collective security arrangements. On the other hand, an individualist nation tends to act alone in international and security affairs, seeking mainly bilateral relationships with other nations and avoiding multi-alliances and organizations.

Stimulative vs Reactive: The nation that is stimulative in international affairs tends to promote change and takes a leadership role in that change. A stimulative nation initiates action in the international environment. Conversely, a nation that is reactive in international affairs tends to respond to change and acts mostly when it perceives itself to be threatened. Nations that tend to be reactive are often cited as nations possessing a "status quo" syndrome.

Decisive vs Accommodative: A nation that is decisive in international affairs tends to seek positive and absolute solutions to problems facing it, including perceived security threats. A decisive nation will take firm steps in whatever direction it decides to go. In contrast, a nation that is accommodative in international affairs will seek to resolve problems in the least possible conflictual manner. Such nations generally take cautious steps and tend to make compromises and incremental decisions rather than absolute ones. With these four sets of dichotomous variables, it is theoretically possible to set forth 16 separate general strategies.

At first glance, all 16 of these general strategies may appear to be viable. However, the four strategies that contain both the variable "introversive" and the variable "stimulative" must be discounted as illogical and contradictory, given the focus on international environments. But the remaining 12

combinations of variables do represent viable alternative general strategies. These 12 viable strategies are:

* Projective/Collectivist/Stimulative/Decisive
* Projective/Collectivist/Stimulative/Accommodative
* Projective/Collectivist/Reactive/Decisive
* Projective/Collectivist/Reactive/Accommodative
* Projective/Individualist/Stimulative/Decisive
* Projective/Individualist/Stimulative/Accommodative
* Projective/Individualist/Reactive/Decisive
* Projective/Individualist/Reactive/Accommodative
* Introversive/Collectivist/Reactive/Decisive
* Introversive/Collectivist/Reactive/Accommodative
* Introversive/Individualist/Reactive/Decisive
* Introversive/Individualist/Reactive/Accommodative

When the array of the 12 viable general strategies is analyzed, one of the observations about these strategies is they tend to be divided along two axes as far as the general operational characteristics of the nation-state are concerned. The first of these axes is the nationalist and internationalist axis. The 12 general strategies for nation-states are split evenly on this nationalist and internationalist orientation, varying, however, in the degree the individual general strategy manifests either the nationalist or internationalist attribute. The second of the two axes concerns the orientation of the general strategy towards aggrandizing or consolidating the power and status of a nation-state. Again, the general strategies are divided evenly on this axis, varying only in the degree of attraction to either the aggrandizing or consolidating poles. The importance of this analysis relative to competitive strategies development lies in the capability to sense the "personality of the nation" or determine in general terms the current and future national outlook or outlooks to which its people are moving with respect to their attitude toward the world, other nations, and their accompanying foreign policy. This provides the basis for development of realistic national security objectives.

SECTION III -- OBJECTIVES AND CAPABILITIES

National Security Objectives

National security objectives are developed and articulated as goals to overcome the threats and divergent interests to the nation's security but go beyond the physical well-being of a government's people. For example, if the US perceives a nation's military forces or support for transnational terrorism a threat to US sovereignty, physical security, or economic security, the US national security objective would be to prevent the use of that nation's forces against the US. The potential threat posed by a nation's combat capability is not just military in nature but also has political and psychosocial aspects to it. Hence, the national security objective example given above encompasses the prevention of not only the military uses of force but also the political and psychosocial uses. It should be emphasized again that the vast differences between the intensity and severity of these different aspects of a particular threat are clearly reflected in the resultant strategies which are developed to achieve this national security objective.

As threats and divergent interests change, emphasis on particular security objectives also change to reflect the dynamics of the environment. In general, however, a nation's security objectives might be developed to reflect something like the following:

* Provide strategic defense of the country.
* Deter armed aggression of any kind against the country and its allies.
* Should deterrence fail, defeat the aggressor.
* Encourage allies and friends to defend themselves against invasion and insurgencies.
* Ensure and protect access to resources, oceans, and space.
* Contain and reverse expansionism of the country's principal adversaries.
* Impede transfer of goods and services to those principal adversaries which support expansionism.
* Foster long-term political and military change within the principal adversaries and their satellites or allies.

Several of these objectives emphasize areas where LIC competitive strategies analysis might be helpful. One approach in facilitating the understanding of national security objectives in LIC is within the context of the four major components of national power: political, economic, informational, and military. Low intensity conflict competitive strategy analysis is conducted from the perspective of how the military can support the other components of power as they predominate in LIC.

The LIC competitive strategies analysis model is designed to assist the strategists to develop realistic alternatives in a realistic world. Often the strategists confuse the attempt to achieve national objectives across the globe with the position that nation maintains relative to the globe. Ken Booth, author of Strategy and Ethnocentrism suggests:

> Strategy is premised on a clear conception of the nation-state (billiard-ball) model of international relations: governments are seen as the chief actors; defense is conceived to be the primary duty of the authorities; national stereotypes are seen at their clearest; so-called realism is the prevailing philosophy; relations between groups are conceived in terms of power; conflict and war are seen to be necessary and normal because of the struggle for power which determines the major clash of interests. Above all, National Interest is King.[3]

All levels of conflict are a cultural phenomenon. However, to successfully pursue a nation's aims at lower levels of conflict, strategists must be weary of an ethnocentric perspective. This requires an understanding of cultural relativism. Personality, society, and culture form a complete entity. Society and culture affect the interpretation, motivation, and behavior norms and the structure of man's expectations. Understanding those expectations and how to manipulate them can assist substantially in developing realistic strategies for LIC and in determining which components of power to use in that regard.

Components of Power

The components of power are the means a nation-state has available to achieve its national objectives. These means are derived from the power base of the nation-state. Before the components of power can be examined, two other foundations must be laid. First, a "working" definition of national power must be set forth, and second, a description of the composition of the national power base must be given.

John Stoessinger stated, "power in international relations is the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in a way as to affect the behavior of the other nations."[4] In elaborating on his definition, Stoessinger pointed

out that a nation's tangible and intangible resources are not merely what it has, but also what the other nations believe it has. This concept again is especially relevant to LIC as coercive diplomacy is predicated upon a perception of what a nation can do and what it intends to do. One of the clearest statements of the behavioral approach comes from the definition of national power given by A. F. K. Organski. He described national power as "the ability of one nation to influence the behavior of another nation in accordance with its own ends."[5] Organski further stated that power is not a thing but a relation between nations and,

> The very existence of national power presupposes at least two nations having some kind of relations with each other, and it further presupposes that in some matter where they disagree, one nation has the ability to make the other nation do what it wishes.[6]

This definition of national power is broad enough to explain a wide range of interactions between nations. This broad approach to defining national power more accurately depicts relations between nations in LIC and, thus, was used in this LIC competitive strategies development process model. The list of components of power reflect this definition of national power.

Composition of National Power

Once national power has been defined, the focus can shift to the composition of national power, that is, the determinants, elements, or factors of the national power base. As with the definition of national power, there are numerous lists of the elements of national power. A few of these classifications, along with their authors, should illustrate the point:

* Morgenthau -- Elements of National Power[7]

  Geography
  Natural Resources
  Industrial Capacity
  Military Preparedness
  Population
  National Character
  National Morale
  Quality of Diplomacy
  Quality of Government

* Organski -- Determinants of National Power[8]

  Natural Determinants
    Geography
    Natural Resources
    Population

Social Determinants
Economic Development
Political Development
National Morale

* Palmer and Perkins[9]

Geography
Raw Materials
Natural Resources
Population
Technology
Ideologies
Morale Leadership

For the purposes here, recognition need only be made of the fact there are elements of national power which reflect the multidimensional foundation of a nation's strength. As with the definitions of national power and the description of the elements, there is any number of ways of describing the usable power of a nation. For this study, we categorize the components of power into four major divisions: political, economic, informational, and military. However, these broad divisions require more specificity for analysis, for example:

* Strategic Nuclear Forces
* Theater Nuclear Forces
* Conventional General Purpose Forces
* Special Operations Forces
* Governmental Paramilitary Forces
* Private Interest Paramilitary Forces
* Strategic Diplomacy and Communication
* Military Assistance -- Equipment and Training
* Economic Trade and Aid
* Economic Barriers and Restrictions
* Diplomacy and Communication
* Informational Communication
* Technological Assistance

This list of components of power and their descriptions are not presented as the "correct" or "proper" list, only as working terms for the LIC competitive strategies development process. Although these terms are fairly self-explanatory, a short description gives a better appreciation of each component.

"Strategic Nuclear Forces" are the nuclear capable offensive forces and weapons systems that can strike at the heart of the enemy territory, and, to a much lesser degree, the defensive forces of a nation to repel the nuclear capable offensive forces of the enemy. Included in the United States strategic offensive nuclear forces is the so-called "TRIAD" of manned strategic bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"Theater Nuclear Forces" are the nuclear-capable forces and weapons systems that can be used in a theater (operational area of war) in both offensive and defensive roles. Included in the theater nuclear forces are the US Army's various tactical nuclear artillery shells, demolition devices, and missiles; the US Navy's nuclear sea control weapons and carrier-based aircraft with tactical nuclear weapons; and the US Air Force's tactical aircraft armed with tactical nuclear weapons. The difference between strategic and theater nuclear forces becomes blurred in situation where the theater nuclear forces have the capability to strike strategic targets or where the strategic nuclear forces have the flexibility to be used in theater warfare. The distinction is one of objectives and strategy rather than clear-cut functions or capabilities of weapons and forces.

"Conventional General Purpose Forces" are the nonnuclear general purpose military forces a nation maintains. These forces function to protect the nation's interests by their use or threatened use. Included within the inventory are most of the forces and weapons of the US Army and US Navy, including the sea control and carrier task forces, and the US Air Force's tactical air forces, including the vast airlift capabilities. These forces have the flexibility and mobility needed to project globally to protect US interests.

"Special Operations Forces" are multipurpose forces specially trained, equipped, and organized to conduct air, sea, and land operations at any level of conflict, in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These units, which are capable of tailoring their composition to meet specific requirements may be employed in either a primary or supporting role in conjunction with other forces or agencies to conduct unconventional warfare and clandestine, covert, or psychological warfare during periods of peace or hostilities.

"Governmental Paramilitary Forces" are nonmilitary resources, including intelligence assets in support of foreign organizations whose aims are complementary to US national foreign policy objectives. These include activities reported to have been undertaken in Albania, Guatemala, Cuba (Bay of Pigs), and recently against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

"Private Interest Paramilitary Forces" are those nongovernmental US groups or organizations providing support to foreign organizations or governments engaged in defending against or conducting insurgency warfare.

"Strategic Diplomacy and Communication" are the institutionalized and noninstitutionalized channels and processes of communication between the major nuclear nations of the world to address matters of conflict which can lead to nuclear confrontation and warfare. This kind of diplomacy and

communication differs from normal diplomacy and communication in its substance -- potential strategic nuclear warfare -- and its methods -- direct communication between national leaders, specialized electronic communication networks, and high-level strategic negotiations.

"Military Assistance -- Equipment and Training" represents all of the military assistance and military sales programs which involve military equipment (both combat weapon systems and support systems), spare parts, operational training, maintenance equipment and training, and follow-on advisory assistance.

"Economic Trade and Aid" includes all forms of trade and trade agreements between nations as well as economic aid. Economic aid can be in the form of direct grants, subsidies, long-term loans, or goods in kind -- food, manufactured products, fertilizers, and farm machinery. Within this component is that trade and aid which comes directly from or is directly influenced by the government sector.

"Economic Barriers and Restrictions" as a component of power, are predominantly negative and are aimed at limiting or denying access to economic trade and aid. Such actions and programs vary widely in scope and intensity and include the following: restrictive tariffs, quotas, boycotts, embargoes, freezing of assets, and impounding vessels and cargo. As a component of power, these economic barriers and restrictions can be effective as a threatened action as well as an actual action.

"Diplomacy and Communication" represent the traditional political interchanges between nation-states. It represents not only formalities of recognition and the establishment of relations but also the communication channels for settling disputes, exchanging information, and negotiating various commercial and political agreements.

"Informational Communication" is the composite of all programs and actions conducted through a variety of media means designed to accomplish several tasks: (1) instruct domestic and international publics in the policies, goals, and intentions of the nation and to promote understanding and gain support for them; (2) build and project an image of the nation's character, capabilities, credibility, and resolve sufficient to elucidate the national interests and will; (3) explain the nature of actual or perceived threats to the nation, and announce possible responses. These objectives are reached by such means as government officials speaking in public and through the news media, production of government publications and electronic media presentations, news releases, public service messages, government-sponsored public events and institutional assistance, and similar overseas activities conducted by the United States Information Service and other government agencies.

"Technological Assistance" emerges from the advanced industrial nations and is exercised in the form of technical assistance programs or technological transfers to other nations. These assistance programs or transfers can be either in the form of aid or sales. The key feature of this component of power is that it is a product of the industrial society and is available for use only by the industrial societies.

Thus, nations have, in various degrees, all or some of these components of power available to them to achieve their national objectives. The choice of components of power and their use is also addressed in the development and selection of specific strategy options. However, critical to the development of those potential strategy options is a thorough analysis of the threats, divergent interests, and friends and allies.

SECTION IV -- ASSESSING AND ANALYZING THE ACTORS

Friends and Allies, Divergent Interests, and Threats

For the purposes of this framework, the concepts of threats, divergent interests, and friends and allies can be analyzed as shown in Figure 3.

DETER AND/OR COMPEL	
ENTITY	**ANALYSES**
FRIENDS/ALLIES	COMPARATIVE
DIVERGENT INTERESTS	PERSUASIVE PROFILE
THREAT	COERCIBILITY

FIGURE 3

These are the result of the conflicts between a nation's purposes and interests and the international environment, i.e., the alternative future world contexts which will be discussed shortly, in which those purposes and interests exist. These conflicts stem from the attempts by one nation to pursue its national purposes in an international environment in which there are scores of nations, each of which is pursuing its own national purposes. Conflict to some degree is inevitable between nations when the environment challenges or retards the successful pursuit of national purposes by each individual nation.

Therefore, there exists for each nation and any given international context or environment, a host of threats and divergent interests which it must accept, accommodate, or seek to change. These vary sharply in the degree and scope of challenge to each nation. For the purposes of this model, only threats and divergent interests which challenge the security of a nation will be considered, as these force a nation to develop strategies. Additionally, consideration is given to friends and allies which, from a US perspective, represent vital interests where nation building is appropriate. Responses to these challenges can be undertaken either through direct or indirect means. In LIC, the prevalent approach for military involvement is indirect, e.g., helping other nations to help themselves. This indirect military involvement usually focuses on security assistance for developing nations and support to the other components of power.

The development of specific strategy options to satisfy national security objectives requires both analysis of the threat for coercibility and analysis of friends, allies, and uncommitted nations. In fact, understanding the relationship between commitment and stability of nations in LIC was clearly expressed by Mr. Samuel P. Huntington in 1961 when he wrote:

> IF FORCED TO CHOOSE, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PREFER THE CREATION OF STABLE UNCOMMITTED GOVERNMENTS TO THE CREATION OF UNSTABLE PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. Both world powers have to balance their interests in stability against their interests in commitment. The aim of the Soviet Union presumably is a world of Communist or pro-Communist governments. The aim of the United States presumably is a world of stable nonCommunist governments. Thus, the United States should rank stability higher in its hierarchy of goals than does the Soviet Union. Specifically, the United States should prefer a stable uncommitted government to an unstable uncommitted one, while the Soviet Union should prefer the latter to the former. In addition, a stable uncommitted government has many advantages for the United States over an unstable pro-Western government which is constantly under fire from domestic groups and can only serve to attract Soviet or Chinese intervention. Paradoxically, however, United States policy in fact has tended to put a greater emphasis upon pro-Western commitment than Soviet policy has placed upon immediate pro-Communist commitment. The Soviet Union has displayed considerable willingness to work with and to assist "bourgeois" nationalist groups, so long as they were non-Western oriented. It backed Nasser, Kassim, Souvanna Phouma, Lumumba, and Castro in their domestic struggles at times when no one of them (apparently) was a Communist. The United States, however, has been reluctant to back groups which did not have clear pro-Western commitments. It has tended to divide groups into the "good guys" and the "bad guys" and to back the former irrespective of the effects which this may have on our long-term goal of stability. In this area, the Soviets have been pragmatic, and we have been the victims of our own dogma.[10]

The relationship of friends and allies, divergent interests, and threats to national security objectives can be considered in two general contexts or a combination thereof. These are deterrence and compellence.[11] The first one is most familiar to strategists. Deterrence involves the development of a situation where one nation seeks to persuade their adversaries not to initiate an action. Deterrence involves those objectives which, if failed, would result in higher levels of conflict. With a nation's survival at risk, it is understandable a large portion of a nations' defense expenditure is in that area. Additionally,

it is a concept which enjoys the greatest degree of support within most nations' populace. A successful deterrence permits the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness without the loss of loved ones to war. In the mid to high intensity realm, deterrence is considered with respect to a specific adversary or group of adversaries. However, in the context of LIC, competitive strategies involve a far more insidious and undefined threat. Thus nation building of friends and allies may or may not be undertaken with regard to a specific threat. It may be undertaken to thwart a future or undetermined threat.

The alternative concept is compellence and describes the attempt of a nation to persuade an opponent to cease or alter an ongoing action. Because compellence involves a visible change in the adversaries behavior and the associated loss of prestige, it is usually resisted more vigorously and thus is harder to achieve. Thomas Schelling describes the difficulty of achieving a change in the opponent's behavior in Arms and Influence:

> . . . more conspicuously compliant, more recognizable as submission under duress, than when an act is merely withheld in the face of a deterrent threat. Compliance is likely to be less casual, less capable of being rationalized as something one was going to do anyhow.[12]

Compellence is especially appropriate in LIC where an antagonistic relationship exists between nations and the leaders of those nations feel they must do something about that antagonism. However, it is the deterrent or preventive aspects of LIC which has received substantial interest in recent times by helping friends and allies to help themselves.

Friends and Allies

The 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States summarizes the relationship of LIC to friends and allies:

> **When it is in U.S. interest to do so**, the United States:
>
> * Will take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing internal or external threats to their independence and stability by systematically employing, in coordination with friends and allies, the full range of political, economic, informational, and military instruments of power. Where possible, action will be taken before instability leads to violence.
>
> * Will work to ameliorate the underlying causes of instability and conflict in the Third World by pursuing foreign assistance, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of democratic social and political orders.[13]

With a finite amount of resources available for allocation to these tasks, strategists must assign these resources to those nations with the greatest probability of thwarting the threat and achieving US interests.

Comparative Assessment Analysis

Analysts must be able to move beyond the use of intuition or case study analysis and rely on structured comparative analysis wherever possible in the development of a valid analytic methodology. One such approach involves the work of Dr. Max Manwaring in conjunction with the US Southern Command Small Wars Operational Research Directorate. Through work originally undertaken at the Army War College, Dr. Manwaring was able to develop a series of theoretical dimensions which appear to be highly relevant in determining the capability of a nation to resist an insurgent threat. Through the use of these theoretical dimensions and 72 "Factors" included in the dimensions, he was able to apply probit statistical analysis and develop a coefficient of reliability concerning what actions by the actors involved in an insurgency and counterinsurgency are most relevant in successfully determining the outcome of the conflict. The seven theoretical dimensions are:

* Support of Intervening Powers
* Host Government Legitimacy
* Military Actions of Intervening Powers
* Degree of Outside Support to Insurgents
* Actions versus Subversion
* General Political
* Host Country Military Actions[14]

Through the use of surveys structured to develop information concerning these dimensions, a prognosis of a particular nation or group of nations can be conducted to assist in tailoring a nation building campaign to thwart a particular adversary.

Nation building focuses on a strategy to enhance economic, political, and social development of friendly states so they may help themselves. This is accomplished through the promotion of constrained and responsive governments, regional stability, and cooperative security. Programs in which the military have a role include security assistance, humanitarian and civic action, engineering activities, and military-to-military relations.

Security Assistance: Security assistance builds friendly states' abilities to defend themselves and promotes peace and stability, which, in turn, fosters social and economic development, increases interoperability, supports collective security, increases military-to-military dialogue, attempts to focus indigenous military establishments, and is sensitive to the strong desire for the recognition of sovereignty by developing nations.

Humanitarian and Civic Action: Humanitarian and civic action addresses pressing economic and social needs of recipient nations. It helps to maintain national stability and builds on the strength of voluntary coalitions. It also improves US military readiness by providing training opportunities for US personnel that might not otherwise be available. When conducted in association with an effective psychological operation and public affairs program, these actions can help to increase the popularity of the US and the participating military forces.

Engineering Activities: The use of engineering assets can provide substantial assistance to the development of the economic and social infrastructures of host nations as well as promote regional cooperation.

Military-to-Military Relations: Military-to-military relations build professional, apolitical militaries supportive of democratic ideals. Through our associations, we foster good relations with friendly and allied militaries and can serve as role models and effective examples of the proper role of the military in a democratic society, where the subordination of the military to civilian rule can articulate appropriate standards for civil-military relations. One caution involved in developing apolitical militaries which are responsive to a developing nations government is the danger of the governing leadership using this military as a "palace guard" to thwart the legitimate evolution in the democratic process.

Persuasive Profile Analysis

A distinction between threats, divergent interests, and friends and allies is required because a nation's approach to its adversaries is substantially different than to its friends, allies, and uncommitted nations. Competition among friends, allies, and uncommitted nations results in divergent interests. Seldom can long-term strategic aims be achieved through coercive diplomacy of friends and allies or uncommitted nations. While such actions may have a short-term benefit, the long-term results can be less attractive. Altering their course of action requires more subtle and persuasive approaches.

Steve David, discussing superpower competition for influence in the third world suggests the interdependent nature of the future world will cause greater emphasis on each's ability to persuade developing nations they should adopt a pro-American or a pro-Soviet alignment.[15] Issues of ideology, economic development, and security are all complex factors that sway countries from side-to-side. David states:

> From the American perspective, however, this process of **persuasion** is much simpler. [emphasis added] If the United States seeks to compete successfully with the Soviet Union for influence in the Third World, it must

> demonstrate its ability and willingness to protect the leadership of those regimes which it seeks to attract; this will be possible only if the United States can convince these select individuals that political alignment with the West is in their best personal interest.[16]

The persuasive profile is designed to determine how best to influence the ruling elite of developing countries when confronted with a situation in which conflict is often endemic and where loss of power can mean loss of life. In this regard David believes, ". . . the success of the United States in the Third World will depend on how well it can manipulate and satisfy two of the most basic human desires -- the drive for power and the fear of death."[17] To assist in the development of these profiles, strategists might use a questionnaire (Appendix A) to better understand what specific strategy options are feasible in reducing the impact of divergent interests among friends, allies, or uncommitted nations.

Threat Analysis for Coercibility

An effective threat analysis for coercibility goes beyond a recognition that threats possess the capability to impede or alter the attainment of national security objectives. Low intensity conflict strategists require an understanding of the balance between capability and intent. Because images are the source of politico-military behavior, one must focus on how those capabilities and intentions are perceived or misperceived. Development of specific strategy options is enhanced through threat analysis for coercibility. This involves the determination of how susceptible a particular adversary or adversaries are to intimidation or coercive diplomacy.

Coercibility analysis begins with a distinction between an adversaries' resources and the will, or intent to use those resources. Depriving an adversary of his resources (interdicting their availability) is a predominant aspect of coercibility. That is, if he is unable to acquire economic or military resources, his capability to pursue his aims should diminish. Sub-analysis of resources includes a determination of the diversity of internal and external resource availability. Trends in debt and hard currency exchange rates are also required. An understanding of an adversary's access to external resources through alliances is also required.

Resource availability and the will to use those resources are major factors of coercibility analysis. National will and the psychological susceptibility of the governing elite must also be considered in developing a coercibility profile of a nation or group. The work of Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, is beneficial here. Gurr's theory/model applies the deprivation-frustration theory (which is essentially psychological) to revolts,

rebellions, and revolutions which are sociopolitical phenomena.[18] For coercibility analysis, one attempts to determine to what degree decision-makers are willing to "bite-the-bullet" in resisting coercive diplomacy or intimidation. As in the ethnocentristic filter, cultural attunement is critical. Trends in relative deprivation are also useful. Nations which have experienced conflict for extended periods may require a substantial increase in the level of intimidation to create a sense of weariness and thereby alter their actions.

Conflict weariness can be described as a desire, wish, or hope for an end to a war, conflict, or destructive course of action by individuals and groups who are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict as military or civilian participants.[19] It can result from a wide variety of factors, such as prolonged exposure to physical hardship, deprivation, and mental strain (including psychological strains resulting from exposure to violence and loss of affection of family and friends, loss of ideological ardor, and boredom with the symbols and causes of the conflict). The scope and intensity of weariness can vary greatly, ranging from mild forms of weariness affecting only a small segment within a community, to high levels affecting whole societies or nations. Mild forms of conflict weariness mainly involve a dislike for a war without any political act to oppose it. It often represents a wish or hope the conflict and its hardships and deprivations would somehow "go away" and leave the community to resume a more peaceful existence.

As the intensity and scope of conflict weariness increases, so do the adverse consequences, such as active internal opposition to the war, political factionalism among leaders, and disintegration of military and political organizations. The adverse consequences of war weariness rapidly increase when the cohesion and effectiveness of the community's organizations and leaders decline due to any cause, including causes unrelated to the conflict. These causes can be either internally or externally initiated. They can also occur as a result of passage of time, since time seems to erode popular enthusiasm for wars, to undermine fanaticism, and to diminish ideological fervor.

Enthusiasm for the conflict can best be maintained by periodic, easy, and spectacular victories or events which embarrass or neutralize the strengths of ones adversary. In the absence of spectacular victories, the adverse consequences of conflict weariness can best be controlled through an efficient political organization, a disciplined cadre, an attractive ideology, and/or hatred for the adversary.

Coercibility analysis of particular adversaries include an attempt to determine key leverage points. The analysis should provide a series of vulnerabilities where exploitation would force the adversaries to recalculate his capacity to pursue or

continue the current course of action against the US, friends, allies, or uncommitted, but vital, developing nations.

For example, following a coercibility analysis of Cuba, one should be able to develop a series of key leverage points that could include the following:

* Cuba's poor economic condition, which is linked to few and depressed markets.

* Substantial dependence on Soviet Union for aid and assistance.

* Proximity to US and long distance from the Soviet Union.

* Substantial number of deployed military forces involved in conflicts on foreign soil.

* Susceptibility to instability following Castro's death.

* Potential linkage of the Cuban government to narcotic trafficking to finance and promote transnational terrorism.

Key leverage points are "windows of opportunity" which, with the proper application of components of power and within the context of the LIC imperatives (political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and patience which are covered in detail in the next section), could reduce the desire and enthusiasm of both the threat's general populace and ruling elite for their current course of action.

Once conflict weariness analysis and key leverage points have been determined, the task is then to develop accelerators which will precipitate an outcome favorable to the US. As noted previously, passage of time may be sufficient to bring about a sense of conflict weariness. However, US congressional and public propensity for quick success dictates the process of weariness be accelerated for the adversary.

Tom Greene in Comparative Revolutionary Movements discusses the causes and theories of revolutionary movements in terms of accelerators and preconditions.[20] Quoting Charlmers Johnson, he describes accelerators as the, "final, or immediate, causes of revolution."[21] As discrete events occur at a specific point in time, their principal function is to draw individuals with shared values into a group with a common purpose. Greene suggests accelerators for revolution include: military defeat, economic crisis, government violence, elite fragmentation, reform and political change, and finally, the demonstration effect.[22]

The previously discussed strategic constraint of congressional and public support and perceptions often dictate the redirection of an adversary's actions with a minimum of coercive diplomacy toward the adversary. The critical variants appear to be time and resources. The specifics of this point were made by Tim Zimmermann in an article about the American bombing of Libya. He outlined two operational variants of compellence as "tacit ultimatum" and "try and see" and suggested:

> Once an objective is defined, policymakers must adopt an operational strategy by which the objective might be achieved. The most decisive factor in the formulation of an operational strategy is the time constraint under which the coercer must operate.
>
> A principal allure of coercive diplomacy is that it offers the possibility of achieving a policy goal by the incremental escalation of pressure on an opponent, until the costs imposed by the coercer outweigh the gains that derive from the action the opponent is engaged in. Because pressure is applied incrementally and the objective must be clearly defined, coercive diplomacy can be an extremely economical method of eliciting desired behavior from an opponent, while minimizing the risks of escalation. But the degree to which the coercer can afford to economize on the expenditure of force by escalating in small increments is determined by the urgency with which the objective must be achieved.[23]

Thus, the development of specific LIC competitive strategy options against a particular threat occurs from the output of the four intermediate modules of coercibility analysis, conflict weariness analysis, key leverage points, and accelerators. Additional options are derived by helping nations to help themselves through nation building and persuading those nations with divergent interests that the US course of action is also in those nations' best interest.

SECTION V -- DEVELOPING SPECIFIC STRATEGY OPTIONS

Specific Strategy Options

The specific strategy options are the alternative courses of action or programs that may be selected by a nation to achieve its stated national security objectives. These strategy options must satisfy at least the following conditions:

* The option must be based upon a current version of one of the alternate future worlds or a variation.

* The strategy option must be achievable by the use of the available components of power.

* Each option is developed within the context of leading and supporting components of power and must present a plausible course of action to achieve or satisfy the national security objective.

* LIC imperatives relative to the employment of the components of power must be considered.

* The strategy option must take into account the strategic constraints which affect the achievement of the specific national security objective.

The array of strategy options for a given national security objective should include all of the major alternative courses of action available to achieve that objective. The options are stated in general terms and do not spell out specifically how the action is to occur or how the component of power will be applied.

To assist in the process of listing potential options and selecting particular courses of action, the worksheet at Appendix B was developed. This worksheet compares the current strategy (if one exists) with the potential competitive strategy. For ease of analysis, the options are grouped into the four traditional components of power. One must recognize the interdependent nature of these components within LIC and should consider the relationship of particular components leading and others supporting. For example, while the military is usually in a support role within LIC, it often finds itself thrust into the lead by those the military is supporting. Military strategists should consider how the military supports each of the components to create the conditions within the environment that will cause the desired outcome.

The action words in each of the option statements should reflect the broad nature of the action and distinguish each kind of action from other actions. For example, the action words for the alternative option statements for a particular national security objective might be "destroy," "deter, " "neutralize," or

"dissolve." Each of these words connotes a different category of action in terms of intensity and approach and is clearly distinguishable from the others. In a given alternative national security strategy for a particular world context, a minimum of a primary and secondary option should be developed.

Alternative Future World Contexts

The alternative future world contexts refer to the eight alternative future worlds within the context of potential alternative international and national environments. It should be emphasized that the strategy development process was designed to function with any world context, present or future, as the key input. The strategy development process is equally capable of developing national security strategies for nations other than the US, as long as a minimal amount of information about the internal affairs of a nation is known.

Every attempt has been made to develop a universal strategy development process. The assumption driving this development was that the more universal the process model is, the less likely it is to underplay or overplay any of the uniquely national factors of the US. Hence, the initial input to the strategy development process contains a general description of the world environment and a statement of conditions in the US. A short summary of each of these eight worlds will be given. At the outset, it should be reemphasized that these eight worlds are all plausible, but not likely to occur. Additionally, one would not expect the future world to be a template of one of the postulated alternatives, but, rather, a broad parameter in determining the course of the world environment.

The first alternative future world context is referred to as the Standard world. This is basically today's world projected over the next 20 years. On balance, the Standard world is mildly integrative in a military sense and slightly disintegrative in an economic sense. The form of the international system is bi-tetrapolar -- bipolar militarily because the US and USSR retain their strategic preponderance and tetrapolar economically with a moderate amount of cooperation among the US, the USSR, Western Europe, and Japan. The plight of the developing nations is gradually worsening. Nuclear diffusion is somewhat restrained in that only two mutually hostile nations acquire a limited nuclear capability. A potential exists for more diffusion. A moderate amount of LIC, and specifically insurgencies, exist.

The second alternative future world is called the Near-Familial world. This world is more politically and economically integrative than the Standard world context. The international system is bi-tetrapolar -- the US and USSR retain their strategic preponderance, but the world is economically tetrapolar with a high amount of cooperation among the US, the USSR, Western Europe, and Japan. This cooperation fosters a lot of economic

development for developing nations. Nuclear diffusion is restrained to the absolute minimum with no additional nations having nuclear weapons. Conflicts are basically sublimated, scattered, and confined principally to low intensity within developing nations. This context represents the most optimistically attainable alternative future world, considering domestic and international complexities and realities.

The third alternative future world is the Eco-Cohesive world. It is more economically integrated than would be expected, considering its political-military conditions. In effect, the economic integrativeness provides the cohesion for most international interactions. It is a tri-tetrapolar world in which the US, the USSR, Western Europe, and Japan are economic poles. Although cooperation fluctuates between them, their strength and stability work toward the progress of the developing nations and the world in general. In contrast, the world is barely integrated militarily. The US, the USSR, and the PRC are nuclear poles although the PRC nuclear capability is less sophisticated and numerically smaller than the other two forces. Nevertheless, the PRC rise to nuclear pole status limits the political-military integrativeness of the world. Minimum nuclear diffusion and a moderate potential for conventional confrontation and conflict are important but lesser factors which militate against integrativeness.

The fourth alternative future world is the Recidivist world. This world is a relapse into a condition which approximates the Cold War following World War II. The form of the international system is somewhat tight bipolar between the US and the USSR with other potential powers opting to reduce their global profile. The economic poles consist of the US, the USSR, Western Europe, and Japan. There is some cooperation between them but almost exclusively along the bipolar alignment. Moderate nuclear diffusion and numerous conventional conflicts contribute further to the military and economic disintegration. The developing nation's status is stagnant or slightly receding.

The fifth of the alternative future worlds is referred to as Dissonant. In this particular alternative future context, the tri-tetrapolar world is moderately disintegrative in a military sense and slightly disintegrative in an economic sense which, on balance, gives the appearance of a dissonant environment. The US, the USSR, and the PRC have nearly comparable strategic nuclear capability but PRC deficiencies in nuclear sophistication are counterbalanced by massive numbers in strategic nuclear forces. Moderate nuclear diffusion and a large number of LICs combined with occasional sustained border conflicts add to the military disintegrativeness. Economically, the four poles are the US, the USSR, Western Europe, and Japan. A high degree of interdependence, intense competition for resources and commerce, and selective cooperation are factors which lead to the disintegrative economic environment. Several developing nations

form cartels to enhance the value of their resources and manipulate and exploit this condition to their advantage. Most of the conventional conflicts involve minor powers and less developed nations competing for those resources.

The sixth alternative future world is called Disarray. In this alternative world, the tri-tetrapolar world is highly disintegrative and in disarray. Strategic nuclear preponderance is distributed among the US, the USSR, and the PRC. However, the Chinese do not yet compare with the other two. Rapprochement is re-established between the USSR and PRC and both are politically hostile to the US. Extensive nuclear diffusion of a limited nuclear capability also occurs. This has the effect of further isolating the US from world influence and prestige. National economies (particularly that of the US), the international monetary system, and economic relationships suffer from the political and military disintegration. Some cooperation exists but fluctuates among the four economic poles -- US, USSR, Western Europe, and Japan -- and the advanced nations. Most developing nations are exploited under these conditions and the economic gap between them and the advanced nations widens severely.

The seventh alternative future world is Global Turbulence. It is a militarily tense and economically chaotic world. All vestiges of detente have disappeared and the three most powerful military nations -- the US, the USSR, and the PRC -- are mutually hostile. Most traditional military alliances have been shattered by economic turmoil. The developing nations have been overwhelmed by persistent population, food, and developmental problems and have turned to militant nationalism. Governments' durations are short with extensive insurgencies. The potential for conventional conflict is very high. The advanced nations, dependent on failing developing nations for resources and markets, have resorted to economic warfare for survival.

The last of the eight alternative future worlds is called Nuclear Contagion. The diffusion of a nuclear capability to 15 or 20 additional nations is the principal characteristic of this alternative future world context. Much of the diffusion matures to minimum deterrence or near second-strike status. The extent of the contagion creates a polycentric form of the international system in which there are no explicitly recognizable nuclear poles. Mistrust, suspicion, and uncertainty are rampant and tendencies toward a nuclear confrontation and conflict are strong. Conflicts are low intensity and kept to a reduced frequency because of the substantial fear of nuclear escalation. Little economic cooperation exists between the four economic poles -- US, USSR, Western Europe, and Japan. Developing nations try to improve their status but with little progress.

With these eight alternative worlds as the basis for option development, the analysis can turn to another closely aligned concept. This concept is called strategic constraints.

Strategic Constraints

Strategic constraints are the product of the interaction of the two elements given in each of the alternative future world contexts -- the general world conditions and the specific conditions of the nation for which the strategy is being developed. Strategic constraints are defined as those considerations emanating from a given world context which significantly limit the freedom of a nation in selecting a course of action in that world context.

For example, one of the primary strategic constraints on the US in the Standard world is the nuclear parity between the US and the USSR. The effects of this particular constraint transcend the spectrum of strategy alternatives for the US on a wide range of issues. To a slightly lesser degree, this constraint also affects the strategy alternatives for the USSR. The strategic constraints for the US in a given world context reflect not only the nature of the world but also reflect the perception by the US of its role and position in that world. The strategic constraints affect both the selection and articulation of the array of specific strategy options and the selection of the primary and secondary alternative options from the array. David Tarr, in discussing political constraints and limitations, refers to the work of Herbert Tillema and his theory of restraints upon the use of force by the US. Tillema links closely the external and internal constraints:

> (1) Threat perception -- The seriousness of perceived danger of a communist controlled government being imposed upon a country not having one.
>
> (2) Tacit agreements between superpowers -- US and USSR will avoid fighting each other directly and refrain from using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries.
>
> (3) Decision-making process -- The use of group decision-making, complex organizations and the use of experts suggest that an incremental response is likely and the resort to force made incrementally or as a last resort.
>
> (4) Moral dilemma -- National values militate for and against the resort to force. A Judeo-Christian perception that force is immoral because of death and destruction but morally justified in terms of either self-defense or defense of others.[24]

While strategic constraints are depicted as an input into specific strategy options, they are also reflected in other modules. For example, if a national security objective of the US was to prevent USSR expansionism and global exploitation of a

particular developing nation which was experiencing instability, strategic constraints might include the following:

* The US/USSR nuclear balance profile.
* Reliance on energy and raw material inputs.
* US domestic economic satisfaction coupled with a moderately low perception of external threat.
* Public and political opinion of key allied nations.

Thus, strategic constraints are reflected in such broad modules and sub-modules as threats, divergent interests, and congressional and public support.

Low Intensity Conflict Imperatives

While many of the concepts included in this study have applicability at other levels of conflict, the effective development and selection of useful LIC competitive strategy options require a basic understanding of the challenges LIC presents. It is not peace and it is not war in the conventional sense. This blurring of many traditional concepts developed at the conclusion of World War II requires a filter or a set of LIC-colored glasses be used when developing specific strategy options. Low intensity conflict imperatives provide such a filter and give more specific guidance than the principles of war or doctrinal tenets which apply to all operations.[25]

Low intensityt conflict imperatives, as distinguished from the Army AirLand Battle imperatives incorporated in Army Field Manual 100-5 or Air Force imperatives covered in Air Force Manual 1-1, focus on all aspects of LIC, not just the direct application of military forces in combat.[26] The Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict's work in this area has developed the following imperatives for success: political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and patience.[27]

Political Dominance stresses the dominance of the political dimension over the military and often the distinction between the two dimensions is blurred. Thus, the importance of seeking competitive strategies beyond direct combat and into the indirect aspects of how military capabilities can support political, economic, and informational components of national power.

Unity of Effort translates the multidimensional realities of LIC into an integrated national effort. Distinctions between war and peace must not be used to support individual agencies' perceptions of LIC as "business as usual."

Adaptability stresses cultural attunement with a nonethnocentristic approach to strategy development. Consideration to specific situations as well as regional uniqueness is required in the development of specific strategies.

Legitimacy of US actions and the actors supported in the LIC arena is required to build stability over the long term. Strategies that undermine legitimacy have limited utility in the evolving world context.

Patience tempers the desire for immediate, decisive results with the need to achieve the long-term objectives against the threats and divergent interests. It involves the need to carefully structure milestones and measures of merit in a manner adaptable to the fluid and uncertain political nature of LIC.

SECTION VI -- SELECTING, IMPLEMENTING, & MEASURING THE STRATEGIES

Select and Implement Strategy Options

Previously, when discussing general strategies, it was pointed out there were 12 viable general strategies. A general strategy was defined as a set of broad outlooks or behavior patterns a nation adopts in a given set of national and international environments. The selection of one of these general strategies for a given nation is dependent on the international and internal conditions stated in the alternative world context. But the selection process is not as automatic nor as simple as it may seem. In any given alternative world context, there is always more than one general strategy available to a nation. The selection of one general strategy over another depends on key decisions by the political leadership, and, in some nations, acceptance by the populace concerning the role that the nation-state will play in international affairs. Within the strategy analysis process, this is reflected in the congressional and public support assessment process.

Once the decision to pursue a particular strategy option has been made, resources must be allocated. This process is reflected in the competitive strategies worksheet at Appendix B as the costs associated with the current strategy and those costs associated with the specific strategy option. Considerations of cost would have obviously been made earlier in the process. However, in LIC, the relationship between MOMs and resource allocation might take on added significance. That is, if the strategy option is in some way measurable and realistically achievable, a cost/benefit analysis would have occurred in the MOM development process. If this is the case, the resource allocation section should be a verification of the estimates used during MOM development. Incremental allocations might be considered in terms of whether the option could not be realistically achieved unless "X" amount of resources are allocated against the effort. Increments of "Y" resources would then give added features or a better probability of success.

Creation of an implementation plan serves several useful purposes. The plan establishes consensus between horizontal and vertical organizations within the government or governments involved with the effort. That consensus includes what steps are required to implement the strategy and what time lines are realistically achievable. Some of the previous analysis efforts associated with developing specific options would be included in the implementation plan. Each strategy will have its individual steps for implementation; however, an example of the following considerations might be appropriate:

* Ensure the availability of accurate and constantly updated intelligence.

* Assemble highly trained professional individuals and units for the task.

- Ensure the availability of reliable mobility assets.
- Establish an adequate and protected communications capability.
- Nurture and cultivate local sympathies and facility availability in the target area.
- Obtain consensus in appropriate national and international elements of power prior to commitment of a strategy option.

* Prepare and coordinate appropriate level taskers and directives for the main politico-military decisions.

Strategy implementation is accomplished at various levels of government and over various periods of time. Some LIC strategy options may be implemented over only a few weeks but most will probably take substantially longer. The strategist can expect close public and congressional scrutiny when consideration is being given to a particular option.

Congressional and Public Support

We have seen the development of specific strategy options are constrained by a variety of external and internal forces. One of the internal forces is congressional and public opinion. Therefore, assessing the potential of congressional and/or public support for a particular option or course of action is invaluable in determining the long-term potential for the option. Regardless, the question of the public's role in foreign policy is a continuing debate. The quadrennial report of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1987," provided a succinct view on this debate:

> Public opinion plays an important part in democratic theory. To be sure, theorists disagree about what the public's role ought to be, especially when it comes to foreign policy. Some advocate populistic democracy in which government policy responds directly to what a majority of citizens want. Others argue that enlightened leadership ought to promote what it sees as the public interest, even if that means carrying out policies that are (at least in the short run) unpopular with the public. Still others emphasize the importance of leaders educating and informing ordinary citizens so that public opinion rests upon a solid foundation and the preferences of leaders and citizens do not conflict.[28]

Of course the level of congressional and public interest varies with the perception of the seriousness of the particular event, a perception which is often initially fed by information and ideas from the media. Additionally, in LIC, the relationship of the military component of power to other national components helps to form perceptions. For example, the public will likely favor a strategy predicated on direct US military intervention only if the public perceives such action as justified. "Public support for a war will depend on many factors, including perception of the stakes involved, the identity of the aggressor, the type of regime the United States is defending, and the risks of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union."[29] Congressional and public support for an American friend and ally victimized by aggression from communism is substantially more likely than support to a developing nation engaged in LIC, which is often perceived as a struggle for self-determination.

Creating public and congressional support, however, should not be presumed to be difficult. "If the crisis is severe, there is a good chance that our initial support for any decision will be a consequence of the rally-around-the-flag effect."[30] This could be said, for example, as depicting public reaction to President Truman's decision (without requesting congressional authorization) to commit US forces to the Korean War shortly after its outbreak. In that instance,

> If any potential public opinion problem influenced the President, it was probably his memories of the extremely negative reaction against the Democrats for 'losing' China to the Communists in 1949. And indeed, according to some polls, over three quarters of the public supported the President's forceful response to the crisis. However, both inside and outside the government, it was assumed that the war would be short . . . 86 per cent of the American people believed the war would be over in less than 12 months.[31]

Nevertheless, retaining public support, which is particularly important in insurgency or counterinsurgency because of the potential protracted nature, may be elusive. "Unless the issue is perceived and defined in terms of American liberal values, intervention is not likely . . . to receive sustained support."[32]

The public and the Congress have a perception that LIC is the lower boundary of war. Coupled with our nation's propensity for peace, the frequent conclusion means avoiding LICs. The selection of specific strategy options should be undertaken and structured in such a way to enhance the public and congressional awareness of the benefits derived from that option. Once it is implemented, support must be closely monitored.

Technological Feasibility

Numerous studies have been conducted in the past decades in an effort to postulate the technological environment which the US might expect to face in the 21st Century.[33] Some new and revolutionary capabilities best suited for mid-to-high intensity conflict will also have value in low intensity conflict but other unique challenges will probably remain. In a 1983 report prepared for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command by Robert H. Kupperman and Associates, the specific question of high technology possibilities in low intensity conflict were discussed.[34] Most of their work focused on strategies that were probably most relevant portions of LIC involving low intensity combat. The study outlined two areas where military forces might reasonably be employed:

* As a trip-wire force capable of rapidly projecting military power to achieve specific objectives.

* As a local security control force to reoccupy and control an area following political, military, paramilitary or environmental upheaval.[35]

With respect to the "trip-wire" force, technology might provide extraordinary flexibility and mobility for such employment in a manner that would make the terrain and climatic environment virtually transparent. Strategists might pursue the technological feasibility of lighter-weight, man-portable systems, exotic electrical power systems or communication capabilities, or even petroleum free fuels.

Technology advancements for local security control forces would also benefit from some of the previous described systems. However, emphasis on precision and controlled lethality of weapons might be especially important. Additionally, the capability of ease of movement through cramped quarters and a high degree of security through appropriate sensor systems might also be of value.

Realistically, the future-oriented strategist can develop endless postulations as to what will be technologically feasible and what will not. However, another approach to determining technological feasibility in LIC was developed within the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. In a paper, "Technology Guidelines and Potential Military Applications in Low Intensity Conflicts," Lt Col Kenneth Brothers lists nine guidelines to aid strategists in selecting and developing LIC technology applications. Appendix C contains an expanded description of these guidelines. These nine guidelines are:

* Technology should provide countermeasures against devices which provide undue leverage to adversary efforts.

* Technology devices should have a "bare bones" architecture which provides "building block" adaptability to varying global mission complexities.

* Applied technologies should be sustainable from readily available resources in a specific country or region.

* Applied technologies do not have to be "state of the art," but should be appropriate to meet the threat and be "judiciously economic."

* Technology should sustain long-term growth of the developing nation when insurgency is no longer a factor.

* Applied technologies should be simple to operate and should consider the "average" user's skill level.

* Complex, superior technology should be applied to intelligence and communications activities.

* When the US supports freedom fighters, technology should produce economically viable force multipliers.

* Technology cannot be a substitute or replacement for effective human infrastructures in developing nations.[36]

Resource Availability

Closely linked to technological feasibility and strategic constraints is resource availability. This requirement goes beyond the question of access to raw materials or a nation possessing the economic wherewithal to procure necessary capabilities. Availability of resources may be as basic as time-place utility, where modern lead times require a research and development posture capable of substantial leaps forward while meeting the accompanying high-risk challenges of such a move.

Still another resource consideration, when selecting or implementing a strategy, is the human factor. Such considerations include changes in the demographics of the US or friends and allies. Another might be overcoming the potential pitfalls of technological disinfranchisement where systems and concepts are fielded beyond the capability of forces to effectively operate and maintain them.

Measures of Merit

Measures of merit represent attempts at quantifying and providing realistic, intermediate measures of progress or failures regarding programs instituted to achieve US national

security objectives. The MOM worksheet, Appendix D, is a potential list of questions strategists might ask and attempt to answer before implementing a specific strategy option.

Valid measures of merit should have as many of the following characteristics as possible:

* Accurate
* Unbiased
* Sensitive
* Range
* Resistance to measurement effect

In order to determine the effectiveness of a particular competitive strategy option, it is necessary to develop measures of merit by which one can assess changes in the various components (or dimensions) of the adversary's posture over time. This involves observation and data collection which, in turn, require some form of conceptual or theoretical framework and measurement strategy. To assist in understanding how such a framework might be applied in the LIC competitive strategy development process, one might consider a hypothetical case.

A US security objective in the western hemisphere might be to prevent the current Nicaraguan government from initiating any new insurgencies in Central or South America. Concepts to deal with this problem are formulated in each of the four areas of national power. In the informational area, a psychological campaign is organized to inform the centers of influence within the free world as well as Nicaraguan citizens that their government is actively supporting and instigating violent revolutions designed to overthrow its neighbors.

The program has two major subsets of objectives. The first is a news media campaign. Its objective might be to ensure the number of major newspaper articles (not just editorial pieces) supporting the US position outnumber those supporting the Nicaraguan position by three-to-one in both the domestic US newspapers and those in the non-Warsaw Pact countries. In order to achieve this objective, the program budgets one million dollars annually.

The second major subset is to create elevated expectations among the Nicaraguan people. This will show them the ineptness of their government to meet their needs. To achieve this objective, ten million dollars is allocated annually. These programs are indirect (a form of coercive diplomacy). If successful, both should deter external supporters of Nicaragua and compel the Nicaraguan regime to recognize the legitimate democratic rights of the Nicaraguan people.

Now comes the tough part, developing measurable MOM's. How will you determine if the psychological campaign program is a

"win" or a "loss"? What specific MOM's will take you step by step to a positive outcome? At the end of one, two, or three years, how will you know if you are on the right track?

In the media subset, the three-to-one ratio is the measure of merit. Is it valid? It certainly is measurable, but does it produce a "plus" or a "minus" in achieving the strategic objective? Assume, based on intelligence reports, diplomatic discussions with nonaligned nations, and the like, opinion is indeed swinging against the Nicaraguan regime. This registers as a "positive MOM" and is, therefore, a candidate for further competitive strategy analysis. Here the objective is to take this "positive" aspect of the program and determine if, by providing more funding or some other fundamental enhancement, it can act as an "accelerator" to compel the desired change in the Nicaraguan government.

In the second subset of our hypothetical case, elevating expectations to create dissatisfaction, the MOM is 500 defections from the Nicaraguan armed forces per month at the end of 2 years. Intelligence reports from all sources reveal only 100 defections per month are being achieved. This falls into the "negative MOM" category and becomes a candidate for an alternative strategy analysis. Here the objective is to determine if there are fundamental changes that need to be made to achieve the stated objective and, if so, at what cost.

The difficulty in developing meaningful indicators is illustrated by the work of Farid Abolfathi. His efforts to quantify war weariness in insurgencies resulted in a study on some of the fundamental consideration in developing a conceptual or theoretical framework for measuring conflict weariness. He points out the major techniques for assessing weariness attitudes of a group can be divided into three sets:

1. Obtrusive measurement of attitude and opinion, such as public opinion surveys or in-depth interviews in which the subjects are asked a series of questions that are designed to measure their conflict weariness in an either obvious or more subtle manner.

2. Unobtrusive measurement of attitude, such as content analysis of people's previously recorded or written speeches, statements, poems, or works of fiction in order to assess the degree of their conflict weariness as reflected in these mediums of communications and expressions of feelings.

3. Inferring attitude from the observation of individual and group behavior, such as graffiti, cynical comments about the leaders, evasion of military service, etc., all which are indicators of behavior rather than attitude.[37]

To assist the strategists in developing a list of indicators for a particular situation, an expanded list of indicators of conflict weariness is provided at Appendix E. This list was developed by Mr. Abolfathi and includes a description of selected indicators by category of weariness, a detailed description of indirect indicators, and an example of what indicators might be appropriate for monitoring the Afghan resistance movement.

Feedback Analysis

Measures of merit or indicators of success or failure are considered either positive or negative. Positive MOMs are assigned to those competitive strategy options where analysis determines that the outcome of the net assessment is more favorable than unfavorable. These strategies are continued and remain as selected and implemented strategy options. Negative indicators and MOMs are considered within the context of two broad approaches. First, as specific strategy options where analysis determines the outcome of net assessment is more unfavorable than favorable. A negative indicator or MOM is returned to threats and divergent interests for additional analysis and development.

The effective use of indicators and measures of merit is both science and art. It includes both scientific and intuitive appraisals involving a variety of informational, judgmental, and analytical techniques accomplished through the blending of machine and human in a symbiotic and complex fashion.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Developing a process for analysis of specific strategy options that will effectively meet the unique challenges of LIC is a most difficult task. This study is an attempt to provide a framework and some practical tools to develop the "winning" strategies needed in LIC. As the current US philosophy reflects letting our developing nation allies fight "their" wars, US emphasis will continue to be one of an economy of force. Such economies require the early and effective application of LIC competitive strategies. United States strategies must make the cost of adventurism unacceptable to the Soviets and their allies. Winning in LIC will take time. By patient application of the right leveraged strategies, the US and the free world can remain a bastion of true self-determination.

APPENDIX A

PERSUASIVE PROFILE ANALYSIS

The following questionnaire was developed in its entirety by Adda B. Bozeman and appears in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Covert Action.[38] The questionnaire could be useful in developing a persuasive profile on a particular group or government involved in divergent interests with the US.

Domestic Affairs

Which fundamental beliefs, ideas, and values seem to sustain the society in time?

Which purposes and meanings are assigned to life?

How do people think about power, wealth, authority, order, justice?

What are the sources of the basic beliefs, norms, and commitments? religion? ethnic or national customs? ideology? pragmatism? economic acquisitiveness?

How free and self-directed is the individual?

Which personality types are trusted and respected? Which, by contrast, are distrusted or feared? Which are favored for leadership roles?

What is the general core of fellowship? Which hierarchical pecking orders are freely accepted?

How limited or extensive are such feelings as affection, sympathy, friendship? How common and accepted are hatred and vindictiveness?

What is the value content of intrigue and conflict?

In which circumstances is violence condoned? What is the ceiling for tolerance of violence within society?

How open or secretive is the society in general, such groupings as clans, families, brotherhoods, guilds, or fellowships of friends in particular?

Which dispositions toward oaths and promises or contracts are prevalent?

Are communications between like-minded men direct or indirect and roundabout? In which conditions is duplicity allowed? When can one count on sincerity and good faith?

Do members of special groups communicate through the use of special, politically or socially significant metaphors and symbols?

Which precepts make up the moral order of society?

What do men regard as "law"?

Is law distinct from religion? Is it distinct from the political authority of the day?

In which ways does "law" recognize and protect the individual?

Is citizenship a developed concept?

How is political authority rendered?

Which elements make for stability in society? Which, by contrast, induce disorder?

Foreign Affairs

Which political units or organisms should be recognized for purposes of foreign policy and intelligence assessments?

Is our perception too narrowly focused on "the modern state" or "nation-state"?

Has the time come to admit that this European form of political organization has ceased being a universally valid norm in international relations, or that it is today effectively de-Europeanized?

What is the actual locus of political decision-making in foreign affairs today?

Which non-state units merit acknowledgment?

Is territoriality a chief factor in definitions of the non-state bodies?

Is there an underlying ethic that requires attention when one deals with these non-Western associational schemes, and if so what is it?

What is the prevalent world view?

How are relations with other independent societies conceptualized?

Do presumptions stress enmity and conflict or friendship and cooperation?

Is war considered "bad" by definition?

Is war accepted as a norm or way of life, and if so, what do people fight for? When is war activated? Which forms does it take? How is war ended?

How do people think about peace? Is it a definable condition? What is its relation to war?

What distinguishes statecraft in general and foreign policy making in particular?

Are there regionally or culturally accepted rules for the conduct of foreign relations in war and/or in peace?

What is subsumed under the term "diplomacy"?

What is the relation of diplomacy to espionage?

In which ways are existing codes of international or intergroup behavior analogous to, or different from, those accepted by a) Occidental democracies; b) communist societies?

What typifies the society's negotiating style?

What is the place of deception in the society's conduct of foreign relations? Is it generally accepted in war and peace or is it commonly reserved for specific conditions, if so which?

What is the place of "intelligence" in the society's system of foreign operations?

How valid or pertinent are our distinctions and definitions of the elements that make up "intelligence"?

APPENDIX B

COMPETITIVE STRATEGY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

STEP 1. STATE CURRENT STRATEGY AND POLICY:

STEP 2. CURRENT STRATEGY OPTIONS:

POLITICAL:

ECONOMIC:

INFORMATIONAL:

MILITARY:

STEP 3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES:

CURRENT STRATEGY:

STEP 4. COSTS:

CURRENT STRATEGY:

STEP 5. TIMETABLE AND MEASURES OF MERIT:

CURRENT STRATEGY:

STEP 6. RECOMMENDATION:

STEP 2. COMPETITIVE STRATEGY OPTIONS:

POLITICAL:

ECONOMIC:

INFORMATIONAL:

MILITARY:

STEP 3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES:

COMPETITIVE STRATEGY:

STEP 4. COSTS:

COMPETITIVE STRATEGY:

STEP 5. TIMETABLE AND MEASURES OF MERIT:

COMPETITIVE STRATEGY:

STEP 6. RECOMMENDATION:

APPENDIX C

TECHNOLOGY GUIDELINES FOR LIC

The following nine technology guidelines for application in LIC are extracted from the A-AF CLIC Paper entitled Technology Guidelines and Potential Military Applications in Low Intensity Conflict.[39]

Technology should provide countermeasures against devices which provide undue leverage to adversary efforts. Land and sea mines require tremendous resources to counter. The expenditures in the Persian Gulf to counteract floating sea mines are enormous, running into millions of dollars every day. Some estimate these sea mines only cost ten thousand dollars. This cost disparity needs to be drastically reduced. Technology can help eliminate the undue leverage the sea mines create. Land mines are equally troublesome. They can disrupt the local economy and create fear among the civilian populace. They also create a perception the government is powerless to protect its people. Technology should provide cost effective countermeasures.

Technology devices should have a "bare bones" architecture which provides "building block" adaptability to varying global mission complexities. Many US systems are made to meet worldwide, worst case requirements--a form of "one size fits all" thinking. Such thinking may violate an imperative for engaging in LIC: adaptability. For example, many LIC targets are man-sized, non-radar significant, fleeting, and difficult to locate by air. Our experience in Vietnam indicated a slow-moving aircraft was needed to find and mark such targets. This role was given to the forward air controller or FAC. Today there is discussion of a new FAC aircraft, which must survive in a high threat environment. Consequently, it is very maneuverable and high speed, which may make it unsuitable for finding many LIC targets. It also makes such a system too complex and expensive for many of our allies. This lack of affordable adaptability can pose serious limitations on US interests. A more competitive LIC strategy needs to be developed. Some suggest employing an inexpensive "bare bones" STOL aircraft represents such a competitive strategy. It would have simple technology, be easy to sustain, and fill multiple roles. Through proper design, a simple module could be added to perform various missions such as a gunship or reconnaissance platform. If such an inexpensive airframe can be built, then it could meet many of our allies' needs. "Large quantity" purchases by many of our allies may help keep the price down, substantially enhancing this strategy.

Applied technologies should be sustainable from readily available resources in a specific country or region. As an example, some US radios require special batteries. However, with

proper design, readily available commercial batteries could do the job. True, commercial batteries would not last as long as special batteries, would not meet military specification standards, and might not work well in certain climates such as the arctic. But commercial batteries could work in most cases and significantly reduce logistic support requirements. By using readily available commercial products, you also help our allies' economy to grow.

Applied technologies do not have to be "state of the art," but should be appropriate to meet the threat and be "judiciously economic." Put another way, you don't need a robot-controlled sledgehammer to kill a mosquito. Many people automatically think "high tech" is the panacea for LIC ills. Others think "low or old tech" is needed. Both camps can be correct. In the British experience in the Falklands, sophisticated radar surveillance systems on the Nimrod aircraft proved invaluable. Simpler technologies like air refueling probes proved equally effective in providing a "winning" mix. Another example comes from David versus Goliath in the Bible. David's original counsel was to use the latest technology. However, he was unfamiliar with its use and felt more comfortable with his slingshot. This simple but old technology was also maintainable, easy to fix, and ammunition was plentiful. It proved sufficient to meet the threat and defeat the enemy.

Technology should sustain long-term growth of the developing nation when insurgency is no longer a factor. Developing a munitions factory is one example. If the manufacturing process is properly structured, the different skills can be employed to meet other needs. For example, metal working skills used to make shell casings have broad application in many other manufacturing industries. Chemicals to make explosives can also be used to make fertilizer. Industries with only military applications leave developing nation economies out of balance when their war is over.

Applied technologies should be simple to operate and should consider the "average" user's skill level. Let's examine computer startup procedures. In the early sixties, starting a computer took a long time and required many different programs be run in a precise sequence. Today, the operator turns the power on and the rest is done automatically with little or no input required. We can take a lesson from the terrorists here. They don't normally use complicated weapons. What really counts is simplicity and reliability. Designing a system to meet US needs that is usable by the "average" developing nation operator is another challenge. The M-16 rifles purchased by El Salvador came with standard stocks. However, due to the size of the average El Salvadoran soldier, the trigger was just barely in reach. This made accurate aiming difficult. The stock needed to be about two inches shorter to correct the problem.

Complex, superior technology should be applied to intelligence and communications activities. These activities give both the illusion and reality of superior government control. With lawful application, they help establish positive control of movement and resources. Even though the technology inside the "black box" may be extremely complicated, it can still be user friendly and simple to operate. Using accurate intelligence and good operations and communications security, the government can frequently target "specific" adversaries. The feeling of being singled out can seriously undermine the adversary's organizational security and morale.

When the US supports freedom fighters, technology should produce economically viable force multipliers. The products developed should help the freedom fighters gain significant leverage against their adversaries. These tools should help make costs of repressing freedom prohibitive. Rather than continue toward bankruptcy, totalitarian governments may accede to the people's demands for true freedom. This is the essence of competitive strategies. Take the Stinger missile for instance. Critics said it could not do the job because of its small warhead and high failure rate in austere operating conditions. In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen have clearly shown otherwise. While it costs only seventy-five thousand dollars, it downs eight million dollar Soviet helicopters like the Mi-24 on over 70% of all launches. This kind of technology yields about a one hundred-to-one favorable cost ratio. It makes Soviet support to the Afghan government very expensive compared to the support the freedom fighters receive.

Technology cannot be a substitute or replacement for effective human infrastructures in developing nations. With the US propensity for the "quick fix," technological innovation is an easy way of giving the impression of immediate activity. If a government security force is improperly structured and does not use information readily available to it, then it will be ineffective. If it also lacks a long-range plan, then pouring large quantities of technological widgets will not correct the "root" problem. Developing **the right organization**, with **the right strategy**, and **the right tools** cannot be overemphasized!

APPENDIX D

MEASURES OF MERIT WORKSHEET

1. Is the option realistic, achievable, supportable by the public and Congress, legal? If so, is it measurable in definable, quantitative, quantifiable terms? List them.

2. If not definable in quantitative terms, what alternative measures should be used to gauge progress? List, if applicable.

3. Define what constitutes a "win" or a "loss" for this option. List in terms of overwhelming, major, and marginal win/loss.

4. What time lines are there to accomplish the option? List intermediate milestones at not more than one year intervals.

5. What level of resource allocation is needed as a baseline?

6. If resources are increased "X" amount, list the probable impact on the effectiveness of the option. List similar impacts if resources are decreased.

7. List other key factors to consider.

APPENDIX E

INDICATORS OF CONFLICT WEARINESS

This Appendix was extracted in its entirety from the unpublished work of Farid Abolfathi entitled, "Assessing War Weariness in Insurgencies" dated April 1987.[40]

Indicators by Category of War Weariness

The five major categories or dimensions of war weariness are:

1. Physical exhaustion of the insurgents and their civilian supporters.

2. Psychological or mental exhaustion of the insurgents and their civilian supporters.

3. Loss of enthusiasm for the cause or struggle within the insurgent movement.

4. Loss of confidence and hope for eventual victory among the insurgents and their civilian supporters.

5. Loss of patience and anger and disgust with the party and leaders of the insurgency.

Physical Exhaustion. Physical exhaustion is a result of extended periods of overwork, poor diet, and lack of adequate rest and sleep. The indicators of physical exhaustion include:

1. Extreme loss of weight.

2. Listlessness and lack of vitality.

3. Nervousness.

4. Mild emotional depression, sullenness, and sadness.

5. Low resistance to diseases and epidemics.

Psychological Exhaustion. Psychological exhaustion is a result of extreme mental anguish caused by loss of family and friends, and exposure to fear and violence (shocks). It can also be caused by extreme feelings of shame and guilt, e.g., as a result of involvement in murder and rape. Finally, individuals' vulnerability to psychological exhaustion is usually greater when they are in a physically weakened state. The indicators of psychological exhaustion include:

1. Moodiness and a tendency to appear melancholy.

2. Dazed look or shell-shocked appearance.

3. Extreme nervousness and irritability.

4. Despondency or a tendency to be extremely pessimistic.

5. Manic-depressive behavior or extreme mood changes between great excitement and deep depression.

6. Neurotic depression, or a state of high anxiety, phobias, and obsessions (often with minor issues).

7. Deterioration of memory for details.

8. A tendency to daydream.

9. A tendency to confuse dreams with reality.

10. A tendency to become obsessed with schemes for distant future.

11. A tendency for gullibility.

12. Loss of enthusiasm for the cause or struggle.

13. Loss of weight (often in spite of adequate diet).

14. Sleeplessness due to tension or nervousness.

15. A tendency to look older than one's real age.

Loss of Enthusiasm for the Cause. Loss of enthusiasm for the cause or struggle can result from a wide variety of causes, such as loss of faith in the basic goals and values associated with the conflict or struggle, decline in hatred for the adversary, loss of ideological fervor, loss of faith in the integrity or worth of the cause, exposure to the reality or ugliness of death and destruction in wars (the evaporation of the romanticism of wars), deprivations, and frustration of personal goals. In most cases, some loss of enthusiasm is the inevitable result of the simple passage of time. The only way that enthusiasm can be maintained is to periodically score easy but spectacular victories. An external factor that sometimes plays a major role in the loss of enthusiasm is the loss of foreign assistance or international diplomatic support. The indicators of loss of enthusiasm for the cause include:

1. Absence of spontaneous enthusiasm and support for the cause or struggle by individuals and groups.

2. A tendency by individuals to prefer to describe their own personal difficulties or family problems rather than to talk about the nobility of their common struggle.

3. A tendency by individuals to complain about the high economic burdened of the insurgency (or a tendency to blame the insurgents for their economic setbacks and problems).

4. Complaints by the civilian supporters of the insurgents that they have already wasted too many family members for the cause.

5. A tendency of civilians to evade serving in the insurgents' armed forces, organizations, and work projects.

6. Increase in desertion from the insurgents' armed forces.

Loss of Confidence or Hope. Loss of confidence in the future of the struggle and the fading of hope of eventual victory can result from numerous causes. The most devastating of these is the loss of faith in the effectiveness of one's own army, organizations, and leaders which often follows a major military defeat. However, it is possible for the loss of confidence or hope to creep up slowly as a result of a growing perception that the struggle is futile and people's sacrifices may not be rewarded by any eventual victory. The indicators of loss of confidence or hope include: (Indicators 1 and 2 can be also expressed as ratios. For example, the number of captured and surrendered guerrillas can be divided of the total number of guerrilla losses).

1. An increase in the number of guerrillas captured alive or surrendering to government forces.

2. An increase in the number of defections and desertions in the guerrilla units.

3. A decline in the aggressiveness of guerrilla units during patrols or offensive operations.

4. A tendency for guerrilla commanders to blame each other for problems and setbacks (rather than rallying together to overcome the difficulties).

5. Increased reluctance by civilians to provide food or money for the insurgents.

6. Increased reluctance by civilians to serve in the insurgent armed forces and organizations. (Or decline in recruitments and losses ratio for the guerrilla units.)

7. Increased reluctance by civilians to volunteer information to the insurgents about the activities of government security forces.

8. Increased open complaints by the civilians that the guerrillas have failed to protect them from government forces and assassins.

9. Increased cooperation between the civilians and the government forces.

Loss of Patience with the Party and Leaders. Loss of patience, disgust, or anger with the party or leaders of an insurgent movement can result from many causes, such as unfulfilled promises; loss of faith in the integrity and competence of the leadership; the announcement of wildly unrealistic plans or goals by the party or leaders; and unexplained changes in such plans, goals, and policies by the party and leaders that are perceived by the people as unjustified or illegitimate. Anger with party and leaders is often increased when people believe the frustrations of their own personal goals and ambitions are due to the actions and policies of the insurgents. The indicators of loss of patience, disgust, or anger with party and leaders include:

1. Political alienation or acts displaying deliberate disinterest in (or withdrawal from) the struggle.

2. Deliberate lack of cooperation with or lethargic involvement in the activities of the insurgent organizations. (This is the political equivalent of an industrial work slowdown by labor unions.)

3. Small, low risk acts of defiance against the party and leaders, e.g., sarcastic antiparty and antileader jokes; graffiti making fun of the leaders; popularization of anti-party poems and songs; defacing of party posters and pictures of leaders.

4. Excessively harsh measures by the insurgent leaders to punish criticism of their actions and policies.

5. Abandonment of the insurgent movement by the lower level cadre and civilian supporters and sympathizers.

6. Participation of lower level cadre and insurgent supporters and sympathizers in conspiracies and revolts against their leaders.

7. Defection of cadre members and insurgent supporters and sympathizers to the government.

Indicators of Impact or Consequences of War Weariness

The following indicators can be used to monitor war weariness indirectly by assessing its impact and consequences. A total of more than sixty indicators are presented under two categories:

1. Indicators that monitor the impact of war weariness by observing its impact on the military units, cadre members, and leadership of the insurgent movement.

2. Indicators that monitor the impact of war weariness by observing its impact on the civilian supporters, sympathizers, and neutrals (or fence sitters) of the insurgency.

Impact of War Weariness on the Military Units, Cadre, and Leadership of Insurgents. The following indicators can be used to monitor war weariness in an indirect manner by observing its impact on (or consequences for) the military units, cadre, and leadership of the insurgent movement:

1. Loss of discipline among troops, e.g., poor upkeep of weapons and equipment.

2. Loss of organizational cohesion within insurgent military units, particularly during the withdrawal phase of hit-and-run military operations.

3. Breakdown of organized command, control, and communication during major military operations, particularly when the insurgents are on the defensive.

4. Loss of aggressiveness and tenacity in combat operations, e.g., tendency of the troops to run away when attacked.

5. A major decline in the frequency or intensity of insurgent patrolling in disputed areas.

6. Low morale among troops, cadre, and commanders. (In Vietnam, a good source for this was interviews with captured or surrendering Vietcong cadre members. Another excellent source was captured documents.)

7. A major increase in complaints against senior commanders by troops, cadre members, and junior commanders.

8. Increase in incidents involving refusals to obey commands, and attempted mutinies over nonpolitical issues.

9. A sharp rise in harsh disciplinary actions by commanders against their own troops.

10. Political factionalism and disputes at various levels.

11. Internal revolts and attempted revolts by dissenting commanders and cadre over political issues.

12. Large scale purges of dissenting commanders and cadre at various levels.

13. A tendency by the commanders and political leaders to debate their internal policy disputes in public rather than resolve them quietly.

14. An increased tendency for the insurgent leaders and commanders to blame their foreign allies for their own failures and shortcomings.

15. A major increase in the number of insurgents captured alive by the government forces.

16. A high (above normal) ratio of insurgents captured and insurgents killed in action.

17. A major increase in the number of insurgents surrendering or rallying to the government.

18. A high (above normal) ratio of number of defections of hard core insurgents and total insurgent surrenders and defections.

19. A major increase in number (or above normal) rate of troops claiming to be sick.

20. A major increase in number (or above normal rate) of troops with self-inflicted wounds and injuries.

21. A major increase in accident rates of any type and in wounds and injuries unrelated to combat.

22. An increase in preference by hospitalized troops to remain hospitalized after their recovery rather than go back to their units or a major increase in average hospital days per patient.

23. A major increase in number (or above normal rate) of desertion and absence without leave.

24. A major increase in the tendency of insurgents to remain in safe base areas and foreign sanctuaries.

25. A significant increase in the number of cadre members seeking assignment to nonhazardous duties, e.g., administrative duties and diplomatic assignments abroad.

26. A decline in overt displays of enthusiasm for hazardous combat duty by troops, cadre, and commanders, e.g., a decline in exceeding orders to seek combat opportunity during military operations.

27. Increase in insurgent abuses of the civilian population (particularly their own supporters and sympathizers), such as looting, blackmail, and rape (or any general deterioration of order in the insurgent zones that are not directly associated with the actions of the government forces).

28. A significant rise in noncombat losses of (or damage to) high value equipment belonging to the insurgents.

29. A major increase in the ratio of number of high value equipment lost and guerrillas killed during combat operations.

30. A major increase in the number of complaints by the troops about poor conditions and abusive commanders. (In wartime Germany, a good source for this type of information was the letters of soldiers to their families from the Eastern front. In Afghanistan, the mujahideen troops are mostly illiterate, but the Soviet soldiers are literate. Therefore, captured letters are potentially a good source for assessing the war weariness of the Red Army soldiers.)

31. A high rate of drug and alcohol abuse among the troops. (This might be a good indicator for monitoring war weariness of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, as it was for the US troops in Vietnam. Among the Afghan mujahideen, the only group which has a drug problem is the "pay-i luch" secret society units which are located in the Qandahar region.)

32. A major increase in rumors and accusations of betrayals among the insurgent leadership (including show trials allegedly involving such crimes).

33. Abandonment of the combat zones for exile by well known combative commanders (or long stays in safe foreign sanctuaries by such commanders).

34. A major increase in use of coercive measures by the insurgents for recruitment of new troops and for preventing desertion.

Impact on the Insurgents' Civilian Supporters, Sympathizers, and Neutrals (Fence Sitters). The following indicators can be used to monitor war weariness in an indirect manner by observing its impact on (or consequences for) the insurgents' civilian supporters and sympathizers as well as on neutral groups (or fence sitters):

1. A major increase in complaints by civilians about alleged insurgent abuses, criminal behavior, and illegitimate actions.

2. A major increase in complaints by civilians about the high burdens and risks of supporting the insurgents.

3. Increased reluctance by parents to permit their sons and daughters to join the insurgent organizations.

4. Increased reluctance by civilians to serve in insurgent organizations and military units.

5. Increased reluctance by civilians to provide labor for insurgent work projects.

6. An increase in displays of overt hostility toward the insurgent organizations, cadre, and leaders.

7. A major increase in low profile criticisms and ridiculing of the insurgents, e.g., through sarcastic jokes, graffiti writing, and harsh criticisms in private meetings.

8. Increased reluctance by civilians to attend insurgent propaganda meetings and rallies.

9. Open refusals by local community leaders and notables to join insurgent organizations or accept leadership roles in "front" organizations.

10. A decline in willingness of civilians to provide the insurgents with routine intelligence on a voluntary basis, e.g., information about the movement of government forces in the local area.

11. Increased reluctance by the civilians to provide food, shelter, and money to the insurgents.

12. An increased reluctance to identify pro-government civilians to the insurgents or to take part in harassment of pro-government families.

13. A decline in the number of pro-insurgent graffiti, banners, and posters in villages.

14. A decline in the civilian readership of insurgent publications, e.g., decline in popularity of reading out loud the insurgents' newspaper in village meetings; decline in subscriptions to the party organ.

15. Loss of ideological fervor among the civilian supporters of the insurgents, e.g., decline in spontaneous displays or enthusiastic support in public, particularly unsolicited displays of such support.

16. A major decline in the ratio of number of youths volunteering to serve in the insurgent organizations and total number of youths recruited.

17. A major increase in the preference of the refugees from rebel areas to settle in government-controlled areas.

18. A major increase in the number of civilian sympathizers of the insurgents who accept government amnesties.

19. An increased tendency for hard core supporters to play it safe, e.g., by moving to the safety of foreign refugee centers.

20. A significant increase in the number of insurgent leaders, senior cadre members, and commanders who are assassinated during visits among or stays with civilians.

21. A tendency to accept with gullibility the most unrealistic rumors about peace initiatives.

22. An increased tendency to cooperate with government forces, e.g., volunteering intelligence about the rebels; identifying pro-insurgent families to government agents; and joining pro-government organizations.

23. A decreased tendency for men of military age to hide from government recruiters and press gangs.

24. An actual increase in government military recruitment or the ratio of government military government radio stations for news and propaganda rather than rebel stations or pro-rebel foreign stations.

25. A major decline in antigovernment graffiti and posters on village walls.

26. A major decline in sarcastic antigovernment jokes, stories, poems, and songs in public.

Comments. The preceding lists of indicators should not be viewed as a definitive set. They represent suggestive lists that hopefully provide the analyst interested in monitoring an insurgency with a wide range of ideas for indicators. The lists should, therefore, be used as guidelines for searching for other indicators with greater relevance to the case the analyst is interested in. In other words, the indicators should be treated as points of departure for "shopping around" for indicators. We can expect that country analysts will find that in each insurgency there are indicators that are particularly appropriate for that case and that there are special indicators which are not found in any other insurgency.

Upon examining the lists of indicators, the reader's first impression may be that they are far too numerous to be practical. How can an analyst, in practice, monitor so many indicators? The answer is that not all indicators in the lists need to be monitored. The lists represent ideas for indicators which each analyst can pick and choose from. There is in fact a good deal of duplication among the indicators. Since we chose to be inclusive rather than exclusive, many of the indicators conceptually overlap or duplicate other indicators in the lists. Furthermore, many of the indicators represent more specific variables that are conceptually encompassed by more broadly

defined indicators. For example, evasion of military service and desertion from military service are overlapping concepts. Similarly, political alienation and withdrawal from political activities is a broad concept which completely encompasses many other indicators of loss of patience with the party and leaders.

In practice, we would expect that the lists of indicators would be greatly pruned down by the limited availability of data. In fact, in most cases, data availability is likely to dictate what indicators can be applied. We anticipate that, in most cases, this constraint alone will cut down the list to a manageable number of indicators.

A Short List of Indicators for Monitoring War Weariness in the Afghan Resistance Movement

This section presents a selected list of 20 indicators which seemed appropriate for monitoring war weariness among the Afghan mujahideen and their civilian supporters and sympathizers. The indicators include both direct and indirect measures of war weariness. It should be emphasized that these indicators represent only an illustrative or suggestive list and should not be viewed as definitive. Secondly, the indicators were selected for monitoring the war weariness of the resistance movement rather than that of the government forces. However, some of the indicators can serve for monitoring war weariness in either camp.

<u>The Short List of War Weariness Indicators</u>:

1. Decrease in aggressiveness of mujahideen commanders, e.g., as measured by intensity of their combat operations; the amount of time they spend in combat zones versus time spent in relatively secure areas.

2. The amount of time key combative commanders spend in Pakistan versus the amount of time they spend inside Afghanistan. (This can be expressed as a ratio.)

3. An increase in willingness of the mujahideen commanders to seriously consider highly dubious political solutions to the Afghan conflict, e.g., proposals for mediation by Zahir Shah; a national jirgah; etc.

4. An increase in the willingness of the commanders to seriously consider negotiating for a peace settlement (rather than a merely tactical cease fire) with the Kabul regime.

5. An increase in internal factionalism and political disputes within the major resistance fronts and parties.

6. Major internal purges of dissenting cadre members and junior commanders, executions of senior cadre members as alleged spies and traitors.

7. A major increase in criticism of party leaders and major commanders by their rank and file members and junior cadre and commanders.

8. A significant increase in desertions and defection of hard core cadre and veteran guerrillas. (The best way to use this type of measure in Afghanistan is to identify desertions and defections by the rank or political importance of the deserter and defector and to create several categories of indicators depending on rank and importance of the deserter and defector.)

9. A decline in the enthusiasm of the Afghan youth in Pakistan to serve inside Afghanistan, e.g., percent of youth seeking combat assignments in the interior versus those seeking safe jobs in Peshawar and other refugee centers.

10. A decline in the ratio of the insurgent recruitment and total combat losses.

11. A decline in the enthusiasm for the struggle or jihad as reflected in the "mood" of pro-mujahideen publications. (This can be monitored through quantitative or qualitative content analysis or theme analysis of articles, poems, short stories, pictures, and drawings in the publications.)

12. A major decline in the war enthusiasm, confidence in future of the struggle, and support for leaders and parties among the refugee populations in Pakistan. (These can be monitored through statistically sampled public opinion surveys.)

13. A major decline in the confidence level of mujahideen commanders. (This can be monitored through in-depth interviews with visiting commanders in Peshawar.)

14. A major increase in the number of civilians who talk about their personal problems, losses, deprivations, and their difficult living conditions rather than talking enthusiastically about the nobility of their common struggle against communism and the rewards of martyrdom. (In the absence of poll or interview data, this indicator can be monitored from impressionistic observations of civilians and refugees.)

15. A major increase in the willingness of refugees to send their sons for education to urban areas under the control of the government.

16. A major increase in physical or psychological exhaustion of the mujahideen fighters. (Indicators for these can be based on a sample of mujahideen wounded who have newly arrived in Peshawar for treatment.)

17. A major increase in aggressiveness of the government militia forces when they are not backed by regular troop and air support.

18. A major increase in the willingness of the government cadre members to spend extended periods in the rural areas without armed guards (particularly in rural areas far from urban centers and large communist military bases).

19. A major increase in the willingness of people in rural areas to serve in government militia forces.

20. A major decline in evasion of military service in the Afghan armed forces, e.g., a sharp increase in recruitment or recruitment and losses and attrition ratio.

FOOTNOTES

1. United States Air Force, New Horizons II -- Volume II (Alternative Strategies) (Washington, DC: 1974)

2. The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States 1987" (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), p. 4.

3. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc, 1979)

4. John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, rev. ed. (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 28, as reported in the New Horizons II study.

5. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 102-111, as reported in the New Horizons II study.

6. Organski, pp 102-111.

7. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 28-29 as reported in the New Horizons II study.

8. Organski, Chapter 7 and 8.

9. Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflen Co., 1969), Chapter 2, as reported in the New Horizons II study.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, "Instability at the Non-Strategic Level of Conflict" (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1961), p. 35.

11. Compellence is a term developed by Thomas C. Schelling in Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-91.

12. Schelling, p. 82, and as reported in Tim Zimmerman, "The American Bombing of Libya, A Success for Coercive Diplomacy?" Strategic Review, Spring 1987, p. 199.

13. The White House, p. 33.

14. Dr. Max Manwaring, "A Model for the Analysis of Insurgencies," A study conducted by BDM Management Services Co. (Contract #DABT60-86-C-1360) for the USSOUTHCOM Small Wars Operational Research Directorate, (Corazal, PN, 1986), pp. 1-19.

15. Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co, 1982), p. 229.

16. Huntington, The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security, p. 229.

17. Huntington, The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security, p. 230.

18. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 24.

19. The concept of conflict weariness is taken from the unpublished work of Farid Abolfathi. One work entitled, "Assessing War Weariness in Insurgencies," April 1987, is available for review at the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict.

20. Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1974), p. 104.

21. Charlmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1966), p. 91 as reported in Greene.

22. Greene, pp. 105-118.

23. Zimmerman, p. 200.

24. Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, ed., U.S. Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1981, pp. 56-57.

25. Willian F. Furr, Lt Col, USAF, Low Intensity Conflict Imperatives For Success (Langley AFB, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1987), pp. 2-5.

26. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 5 May 1986, pp. ii, 22-23, and Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington DC, 16 March 1984, pp. iii, v, 2-4 - 2-20.

27. Furr, pp. 2-5.

28. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1987," (Chicago, IL, 1987), p. 34.

29. Mark Lorell, Charles Kelley, Jr., with the assistance of Deborah Hensler, Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1985, p. 10.

30. Sarkesian and Scully, p. 64.

31. Lorell and Kelley, p. 32.

32. Sarkesian and Scully, p. 64.

33. Some of these include Air Force studies such as the New Horizons II (already mentioned), Air Force 2000, Forecast II and the Innovation Task Force for Long Range Planning. Within the Army these include Army 2000, Army 21, as well as the current US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) effort toward the Architecture of the Future.

34. David Williamson, Jr., Low Intensity Conflict -- Appendix G Technology and Low-Intensity Mission Requirements. A Report prepared by Robert H. Kupperman and Associates, Inc, for US Army Training and Doctrine Command under contract no. DABT 60-83-C-0002, June 30, 1983, pp. 161-193.

35. Williamson, pp. 171-175.

36. Kenneth G. Brothers, Lt Col, USAF, Technology Guidelines and Potential Military Applications in Low Intensity Conflict (Langley AFB, VA: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1988), pp. 4-7.

37. Farid Abolfathi, unpublished report entitled, "Assessing War Weariness in Insurgencies," dated April 1987. pp. 3-7.

38. Adda B. Bozeman, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Covert Action, ed. Roy Godson (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, Inc, 1981), pp. 29-31.

39. Brothers, pp. 4-7.

40. Abolfathi, Chapter 7.

Technical Report
distributed by

DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

DTIC
Acquiring Information –
Imparting Knowledge

Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145

UNCLASSIFIED